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INTRODUCTION
Aristotle's conception of o if u ,
as lie sets it forth in his Nicomachean Ethics , 
Book 4- chapter 3» has had from the earliest com­
mentators up to the present a number of sig-
4nificantly different interpretations.
This is initially surprising. When 
we study this chapter, we find that Aristotle 
describes the megalopsychos in vivid terms. He 
comes alive as a robust, dynamic human being, 
perhaps, even, Aristotle's conception of the 
ideal man. We can almost feel his breath, hear 
his deep voice, see the unhurried movement of his 
body.
 ̂ /Hereafter referred to as 4-.3. UZVxSQtyuxKK
I shall transliterate to "megalopsychia," under­
stood literally as "greatness of soul." ucQcxSoyoxoS 
I shall transliterate to "megalopsychos," under­
stood literally as "great of soul." I shall use 
"megalopsychos" primarily to designate "the man 
who is great of soul," although I shall also use 
it as a predicate adjective as in "The man is 
megalopsychos," that is, "The man is great of 
soul." The context will make my usage clear.
When necessary to distinguish a citation of one 
version of Aristotle's ethics from the other
1
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But the portrait is deceptively simple. 
The concrete descriptions are straightforward, 
but which of them, if any, does Aristotle regard 
as fundamental? By which characteristic does 
he intend to capture the essence of the megalo­
psychos, marking him off from all men of lesser 
stature? What is that characteristic which, 
once named, explains all the others?
''Megalopsychia seems to be concerned with 
great things," Aristotle tells us. "What sort of 
great things, is the first question we must try
Ato answer." Exactly. But nov/here does 
Aristotle give an exact answer. At the opening 
of 4-. 3 he says: fxCXUXolp v x o s  c i y x i
o (ue{rcK(Xcuy d u r o i i  &£ twV oc£ios oJVi "Now the
version, I shall use the customary EN for the 
Nicomachean, EE for the Eudemian.
1W. D. Ross, gen. ed., The Works of 
Aristotle Translated into English, 12" vo'ls. 
(London:"" Oxford University Press, 1910-52),
EN 1123a 33-354-. All subsequent references to 
"Aristotle's writing will be to the Oxford edition, 
unless otherwise indicated. The only difference 
will be that ^ use the transliterations, "meg­
alopsychia" and "megalopsychos." For other works 
cited in this study I shall also, when applic­
able, use these transliterations.
5
man is thought to be megalopsychos who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of
them." At the end of 4.3 b.e concludes:
"Megalopsychia, then, is concerned with honor
oon the grand scale, as has been said."1
In between, Aristotle elaborates at 
a number of places the concern of the megalo­
psychos. with honor.^ This has led commentators 
to conclude that the megalopsychos is basically 
concerned with externally bestowed honor, a 
conclusion that has three versions: a) the
megalopsychos is basically concerned with ex­
ternal honor' and this clearly and simply is that 
of which he thinks himself worthy, b) the meg­
alopsychos is basically concerned with external 
honor, and thus with the great moral action by 
which he will earn that honor, c) the megalo­
psychos is basically concerned with external
11123b 1. ^1125a 35-
^1123b 15-23, 35? 1124a 4-15, 16-19, 
22-27; 1124b 7, 23-25; 1125a 29-35.
honor and thus with living that type of life 
which to Aristotle is most worthy of honor: the
life of theoria.
All three interpretations agree that 
megalopsychia is concerned basically with 
externally bestowed honor. However, there exists 
a basic divergence over whether the megalopsychos 
is a man of moral action or a man of contem­
plation. Using Aristotle's terms, there is a 
basic divergence over whether the megalopsychos 
is a practikos or a theoretikos.
My thesis is that Aristotle describes 
the megalopsychos as a man basically concerned 
with enhancing the nobility of his soul through 
a life of moral action. This means that the 
megalopsychos is: a) a practikos and b) that he 
is basically concerned— not with externally 
bestowed honor— but with his internal sense of 
honor.
The crucial point is that the megalo­
psychos is primarily concerned with his inner 
nobility, not with externally bestowed honor. 
Surface appearances seem to contradict this;
5
they seem to depict a man basically concerned 
with faiiie, or at least with his good reputation. 
Thus commentators are likely to see the megalo-
* ppsychos as a "stuffed shirt," as "intolerable," 
or as a "prig with the conceit and bad manners
7.of a prig."^ For Ross the picture as a whole is 
an "nnpleasing one; it is an anticipation of 
the Stoic sage without his self-abasement before 
the ideal of duty.'1*1’
There are exceptions, of course. Grant, 
for instance, states that "nothing can be more 
subtle or felicitous than many of [Aristotle's]
*V. T. Jones, The Classical Mind (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace~1£~World, 19$9), "p• 272.
pJo A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean 
Ethics« 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892),
1: 55$""(hereafter cited as Stewart, Notes).
^An unnamed Oxford lecturer cited by 
W. F. R. Kardie, Aristotle1s Ethical Theory 
(London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1958), p.
119.
lLSir David Ross, Aristotle, rev. 5th ed. 
(London: Methuen & Co., 19^9), p.’ 208.
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observations" on megalopsychia. But on the 
whole 4.2 has received a bad press, so much so that 
one commentator remarks: "For anything that
could properly be called a rigorous defense— or 
even a sympathetic explication, I have looked
* m 2m  vain."
Ross inadvertently accounts for at 
least part of this bad press. There is indeed 
no "self-abasement before the ideal of duty" in 
Aristotle's megalopsychos. On the contrary, 
self-abasement is for Aristotle one of the vices 
opposed to megalopsychia, namely, micropsychia 
or smallness ,of soul. Russell looks at 4.3 
and "shudders to think what a vain man would be 
like,"^ implying that Aristotle is portraying 
a self-inflated man. Others share Russell's 
estimate. The concern of the megalopsychos "with
Sir Alexander Grant, The Ethics of 
Aristotle, 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: n.p.,
T884‘),"2":72.
pF. A. Seddon, Jr., "Megalopsychia: A
Suggestion," The Personalist, LVI 1 (Winter 1975)* 
p. 31 (hereafter cited as Seddon, "A Suggestion";.
^Bertrand Russell, History of Western 
Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975)»
p. 193.
his owi greatness,” says one, "has something 
overweening about it for, aiming at divine honors,
y]he is divinely jealous of his superiority.”
Another commentator expresses a similar
idea. As she puts it, the megalopsychos
... acts honorably and nobly ... not in 
order that the good may be affirmed, but 
in order that he may maintain unimpaired 
his superiority over his fellowmen;he 
is the ... [man} ... who is always one up 
on his fellowmen, who knows all the 
ploys and gambits for keeping himself 
securely, unassailably, in this agree­able position of superiority.2
“Aristotle does not see fair,” claims
another. "The dice are loaded in favour of
H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotel- 
ianism. A Study .of the Commentary by Thomas 
Aquinas on the Ificomachean Ethics (Uhicago: 
\Jniversity of Chicago Press ,'"1 $';*?), pp. 14-0- 14-1.
pDorothea Krook, Three Traditions of 
Moral Thought (Cambridge: n.p., 19591, p. 5^ •
Cited by Walter J. Bartling, "Megalopsychia:
An Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethical 
Ideal" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University, 1963), p. 57 (hereafter cited as 
Bartling, "Megalopsychia").
magnanimous virtue , but the implications of
magnanimous evil are also there.” He then goes
on to call the megalopsychos a "strange 
aincubus."
Such evaluations as these, however, see 
less than "fair." They assume that the megalo­
psychos is primarily concerned with fame, and 
thus they all too easily conflate megalopsychia 
and self-inflation.^ Aristotle, however, clearly 
contrasts them and any suggestion that he con­
flates them would require argument. Instead, 
the conflation is apparently inferred from the
ARobert Payne, Hubris: A Study of
Pride (New York: Harper & Brother s , Harper
Torchbooks, 1960), p. 55* Rev. ed. of The 
Wanton Nymph: A Study of Pride (London:
WilTiam Heinemann, 195^7^
pI use "self-inflation" rather than 
the often-used "vanity" to render the Greek 
concept t<x.Q\!oS9 "Vanity" often denotes the 
attempt to gain the esteem of other people 
for one's physical appearance, and this use 
apoears at the end of A.5 at 1125a $0. But 
this is only one denotation of chaunos for 
Aristotle. Among others that are plain in 
A.5, it would also encompass his reference 
to hubris at 112Aa 28. Therefore a wider 
expression is needed.
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assumption that the megalopsychos is primarily 
concerned with fame. I intend to challenge 
this assumption in what follows.
Other commentators have adopted a softer 
line. They find Aristotle's portrait of the 
megalopsychos unappealing* but rather than con­
demn it outright, they prefer to think that 
Aristotle was not being serious. For one comment-
y\ator 4-. 3 "seems a caricature," for another
OAristotle is being humorous, for another 
satirical.^ Burnet sees "much quiet humor" and 
claims that the picture is "surely half-ironical."^ 
But these judgments, as well as the hostile ones, 
are understandable only on the assumption that 
Aristotle is giving us a man basically con-
^G. E. G. Mure, Aristotle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 155. Cited 
by Seddon, "A Suggestion," p. 31.
^H. H. Joachim, Aristotle: The Nico-
machean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951)«
p T T ^ T  "Cltid by Seddon, p. 31.
^J. H. Eandall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 19C0), p.' 24-9.
4-J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle 
(London: n.p., 1900) , p..’179.
cerned v/itb. externally bestowed honor. On this 
assumptionv we have seen, Aristotle's megalo­
psychos is either monstrous or preposterous.
These estimates are equally implausible. And 
the assumption they rest on, I shall argue, 
is also implausible.
The conflation of megalopsychia and self­
inflation is not the only one to which megalo­
psychia falls victim. It is also conflated with
AAristotle's virtue of universal justice.
"This form of justice," Aristotle tells us, "is
' complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it
is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It
is complete because he who possesses it can
exercise his virtue not only in himself but
otoward his neighbor also.1'** And he adds that
y\This virtue is distinct from "particular" 
justice, to be discussed below in chapter 1. The 
"universal"-"particular" terminology I adopt from 
Ross, Aristotle, p. 209.
2m  5.1 1129b 30-1150a 1.
11
11 justice in this sense, then* is not part of 
virtue but virtue entire.11
Jaeger refers to megalopsychia in the 
same terms. "It is initially surprising,” he 
states in one of his works, ’’for us to find 
that megalopsychia is considered as a virtue.
And it is also notable that Aristotle does not 
believe it to be an independent virtue like 
the others, but one which presupposes them and
pis ’in a way an ornament to them.”' Now this 
statement seems misplaced. Commentators such 
as Ross inform us that ”in later Greek, justice 
tends to be identical with the whole of 
righteousness."^ Jaeger's statement, then, might 
fipply "to universal justice, but not to megalo­
psychia.
As if to fend off Jaeger in advance, 
Aristotle says that the megalopsychos "is an
11130a 9-
pWerner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of
Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert' Uighet, 2d ed. 
vols. (New fork: Oxford University Press, 194-3-
44-), 1:62 (hereafter cited as Jaeger, Paideia).
^Aristotle, p. 209.
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extreme in respect of the greatness of his
claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness
of them; for he claims what is in accordance
with his merits, while the others [the self-
inflated and the micronsychoi] go to excess or 
1fall short." Clearly Aristotle sees the meg­
alopsychos as striking a mean between two ex­
tremes, a basic aspect of any virtue for 
Aristotle.
In his earlier Eudemian Ethics Aristotle 
likewise believed that megalopsychia is an 
independent virtue: "Each of the virtues seems
to make men megalopsychos in regard to the things 
with which that virtue is concerned .... But 
nevertheless there is a single virtue of megalo­
psychia side by side with the other virtues, so 
that the possessor of this virtue must be termed
pmegalopsychos in a special sense."
Contrary to Jaeger, then, Aristotle did
' M ^ b  3-13. See also 1125a 17-34.
^3*5 1232b 24-27. Trans. H. Racfchara,
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1971)*
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"believe megalopsychia to he 1,an independent 
virtue like the others.11 Of course, it remains 
to he seen whether he is justified in his 
belief. And to see that he is, we first must 
recognize that for Aristotle the megalopsychos 
is a man whose basic concern is to enhance the 





Aristotle introduces the megalopsychos 
as a man who "thinks himself worthy of great 
things, being worthy of them."
Clearly implied is that the megalo- 
psychos is a morally responsible agent, both in 
his own view and in Aristotle's. We need to 
pause on this since it involves a theory of 
agency not generally held today.
When Aristotle enunciates his theory of
responsibility in EFT 3.5, he tells us that "if ...
we cannot refer actions to moving principles
other than those in ourselves, the acts whose
moving principles are in us must themselves also
*be in our power and voluntary." Row this idea 
of moving principles that are in us and within 
our voluntary power is part of a conception of 
causality that includes the possibility of
11113b 19-21. See also 1112a 30, b 32.
14
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self-moving entities. Aristotle extensively 
analyzes self-motion and the physical basis
Afor it elsewhere. All we need to observe here 
is that Aristotle bases his ethics of personal 
responsibility on that conception. Immediately 
after his statement about moving principles 
that are in us, he makes the connection:
Witness seems to be borne to this both 
by individuals in their private capacity 
and legislators themselves; for these 
punish and take vengeance on those who do 
wicked acts (unless they have acted under 
compulsion or as a result of ignorance 
for which they are not themselves respon­
sible) , while they honor those who do noble 
acts, as though they meant to encourage the 
latter and deter the former .... Indeed, 
we punish a man for his very ignorance, if 
he is thought responsible for the ignorance, 
as when penalities are doubled in the case 
of drunkenness; for the moving principle 
is in the man himself, since he had the 
power of not getting drunk and his getting 
drunk was the cause of his ignorance. And 
we punish those who are ignorant of any­
thing in the laws that they ought to know 
and that is not difficult, and so too in 
the case of anything else that they are 
thought to be ignorant of through care-
AMost notably in Physics 8.5* On the 
Soul 3.10, and On the Motion of Animals. "TPo 
my knowledge there has been no sustained analysis 
of Aristotle's conception of self-motion. Some 
of its enormous complexities are spelled out by 
David Furley in a brief paper entitled “Self- 
Movers, " Symposium Aristotelicum. 1975*
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lessness; v;e assume that it is in their 
power not to be ignorant, since they have 
the power of taking care,”
Thus for Aristotle a man clearly is
responsible for the type of character he develops.
Even those who take no care about the kind of
person they become are still responsible for
becoming men of that kind.
Men make themselves responsible for being 
unjust or self-indulgent, in the one case 
by cheating and in the other by spending 
their time in drinking bouts and the like; 
for it is activities exercised on particular 
objects that make the corresponding character. 
This is plain from the case of people 
training for any contest or action; they 
practice the activity the whole time. Now 
not to know that it is from the exercise of 
activities on particular objects that 
states of character are produced is the 
mark of a thoroughly senseless person.2
Aristotle's theory of moral responsib­
ility is implied in everything he says about the 
megalopsychos. This becomes especially sig­
nificant since I am arguing the thesis that 
Aristotle's megalopsychos is a man basically 
concerned to enhance the nobility of his soul
11113b 22-26, b 30-1114a ? 
21114a 4-11.
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through a life of moral action. Indeed, 
almost all descriptions of him in 4.3 indicate 
that he is a man practicing moral virtues else­
where treated in the Nicomachean Ethics. Let 
us explore this.
In his first concrete description of 
the megalopsychos, Aristotle tells us that "it 
would be most unbecoming for the megalopsychos 
to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his
sides." He is obviously alluding to the virtue
? . /of 6 P€/c6 courage. In 5»1 he informs us that 
"the law bids us do ... the acts of a brave man 
(e.g. not to 'desert our post nor take to flight 
nor throw away our arms)." " In 5.2 he charac­
terizes the courageous man as one who stands 
by his comrades;in battle.^ Aristotle neatly 
implies that all such manifestations of courage 
are lacking in any man who swings his arms by his 
side to escape danger. Such a man is not meg­
alopsychos.
11123b 32.
^1129b 19-20. Unless otherwise indicated, 
all citations are from the Nicomachean Ethics.
^1130a 30.
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He cautions, however, that the megalo­
psychos "does not m m  into trifling dangers, 
nor is he fond of danger, because he honors 
few things." This means the megalopsychos is
not guilty of recklessness, the vice opposed to
2courage by excess of confidence. He will,
however, "face great dangers, and when he is in
danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that
there are conditions on which life is not worth
having."^ In 9.8 Aristotle indicates that such
conditions are those that would leave one's
friends or country at the mercy of an enemy.
Faced with such conditions the megalopsychos,
as a good man, would be ready to fight to ‘'the 
4death. As Aristotle puts it in 3-7, he is 
"as dauntless as man may be."^
With his courage, the megalopsychos . 
simultaneously exhibits the virtue of TTP^oT^ 
good temper. He is clearly not guilty of
^1124b 7-
2See 3.7, esp. 1115b 28-1116a 10.
^1124b 8-9- ^1169a 19. 51115b 11.
apathy* the vice opposed to good temper by 
deficiency of spirit, The apathetic person is 
one who is not pained by things, who is not likely 
to defend himself, and who slavishly endures
»iinsult to himself and to his friends. One 
does not find these qualities in the "dauntless" 
man.
Nor does the megalopsychos err by excess 
of spirit. He is neither vindictive nor mindful 
of petty wrongs. It is not his part "to have a 
long memory, especially for wrongs," says
pAristotle in 4-.3, "but rather to overlook them."
In 4.5 this is a marlc of the good-tempered man, 
the man who "is not revengeful, but rather 
tends to make allowances."^ Thus we are not sur­
prised that the megalopsychos is neither an evil 
speaker (not even about his enemies), nor a 
gossip, "for he will speak neither about himself
nor about another, since he cares not to be
4praised nor for others to be blamed." These
14.5 1126a $-8. 21125a 4-5.
^1126a 2. S i  25a 5-6, 8.
20
are marks of the good-tempered man, the man 
Aristotle defines in 4.5 as one “who is angry 
at the right things and with the right people, 
and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and
Aas long as he ought.”
By good temper, the megalopsychos also 
exhibits friendliness, the virtue of 4.6
that involves putting up with and resenting the
pright things and in the right way. Friend­
liness, Aristotle says, also involves a more 
general and positive attitude: the rendering
to each person or class of people what is be­
fitting.^ The megalopsychos manifests this 
attitude in being "dignified toward people who 
enjoy high position, but unassuming toward 
those of the middle class."^ Toward the weak 
the megalopsychos practices the virtue of
generosity. He is the sort of 
man, Aristotle points out, who will give help 
readily, asking nothing for himself or, if he
11125b 52-33. 24.6 1126b 18-19.
^1124b 19-22. ^1124b 19.
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does receive a "benefit, he will confer greater 
benefits in return.
He is ’’unable to make his life revolve 
round another, unless it be a friend, for this 
is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers 
are servile, and people lacking in self-respect
pare flatterers." These people, Aristotle 
states in are dishonest because they place
more importance on what people will think than 
on the truth.^ But Aristotle emphasizes the 
the truthfulness of the megalo­
psychos. He "despises justly (since he thinks 
truly) .... He [isj also open in his hate and 
in his love (for to conceal one’s feelings, i.e. 
to care less for truth than for what people will 
think, is a coward’s part), and he is con­
temptuous, and ... given to telling the truth,
Itexcept when he speaks in irony to the vulgar." 
Aristotle has already alluded to truthfulness
11124b 10-12, 18.
*"1124b 54-1125a 2.
^1124b 28. ^1124b 6, 27-51.
when he introduces the megalopsychos as the man 
11 who thinks himself worthy of great things, 
being worthy of them.” In 4-.7 Aristotle 
describes trutlifxilness as the state of char­
acter of one v/ho "calls a thing by its own 
name .... owning to what he has, and neither 
more nor less. This is an application of his
general theory of truth as found in Metaphysics 
Gamma: "To say of what is that it is, and of
pwhat is not that it is not, is true."
It also accords with Aristotle's treat­
ment of S/koitocriA/TJ » justice, in M  5.^ In 5.2 
and 5*3 lie treats justice as the distribution of 
honor and wealth among the citizens in proportion 
to their merit, estimated on the standard of 
virtue. Justice in this sense is manifest in 
the megalopsychos's concern with honor. "He 
claims what is in accordance with his merits," 
says Aristotle, "while the others go to excess or 
fall s h o r t . A n d  "even apart from argument
1112?a 24— 25* 21011b 27*
^1 am dealing with "particular" justicenow*
^1123b 14-.
it is with honor that megalopsychoi appear to 
be concerned, for it is honor that they chiefly 
claim, but in accordance with their deserts.”
Thus the megalopsychos will "irtterly despise”
odishonor, "since in his case it cannot be just.”
Aristotle succinctly captures the 
megalopsychos's attitude toward honor, when he 
says: "Honors and dishonors .... are the objects
with respect to which the megalopsychos is as he 
should be."^ This is the virtue of right am­
bition, the state of character, says Aristotle 
in 4.4, of one who desires and aims at honor in
Zlthe right way and from the right sources. The 
megalopsychos is sxich a person. He does not seek 
honor from upper class status, power, or wealth. 
Hor will he seek honor from insincere people or 
on trifling grounds. On the contrary, Aristotle 
tells us, "it is characteristic of the megalo­
psychos not to aim at the things commonly held in 
honor, or the things in which others excel, to
11123b 22-23. ^1124a 12.
51123b 22. 41125b 8-9.
24
delay and to hold back except where great honor 
or a great work is at stake, and to be a man of
Afew deeds, but of great and notable ones.*1
Thus far we have seen the megalopsychos 
practicing seven moral virtues: courage, good
temper, friendliness, generosity, truthfulness, 
justice, and right ambition. He emerges as a 
robust, complex, colorful human being, a man 
who is ready to die for his country or friend, 
yet easily overlooks petty offenses; a man who 
is open in his hate and in his love, yet is not 
an evil-speaker; a man who is quick to give him­
self credit for noble works, yet is unassuming 
toward humble people. Yet with all his facets, 
the megalopsychos is a completely integrated per­
son, devoid of conflicting impulses. The various 
parts of his soul are in harmony.
The three remaining moral virtues of 
the Nicomachean Ethics, magnificence, ready wit, 
and temperance, are not as clearly manifested by
1124a 27-b 26 passim. I substitute 
"to delay," which is the literal rendering of 
the Greek, in place of the liberal, and negative, 
"to be sluggish" of the Oxford translation.
25
the megalopsychos. However, when Aristotle 
asks early in A.5 to what end the megalopsychos 
would do base or disgraceful acts, he probably 
has (tto{ppocriJ/'t] , temperence, in mind. Surely 
"base acts" include gluttony, drunkenness, and 
sexual excesses— all of which are the subject of
pAristotle's discourse on temperance in 3.10.
And in 4-.8 Aristotle regards being witty,
•>
€UTe#r(r€\oh as a special case of being friendly,
so we may presume that the megalopsychos's
friendliness involves wittiness as well.^
The only moral qualities of the
Nicomachean Ethics really missing from Aristotle's
account of the megalopsychos are the qualities
of the man ready to spend large sums fittingly,
sthe magnificent man of 4.2, the //e£<x/\o7TiP€F?l 3".
The nearest Aristotle comes to endowing the 
megalopsychos with the qualities of the mag­
nificent man is in pointing out that "he is one 
to possess beautiful and profitless things 
rather than profitable and useful ones."**’
^1123b 32. 2Esp. 1118a 32.
^1128b 7* ^1125a 12.
2 6
But this is meant to illustrate the self- 
sufficiency of the megalopsychos. "This is more 
proper," Aristotle continues, "to a character 
that sxaffices to itself." As such, the passage 
is not really an allusion to the magnificent man.
In fact quite the contrary would seem to be the 
case. For one thing, the practice of magnificence 
depends on the possession of great wealth. For 
another, even a person of modest means, or less, 
might possess "beautiful and profitless things."
The absence of magnificence is significant, 
not only because it is the only moral virtue 
whose qualities are missing in 4.3, but because 
Aristotle insists that the megalopsychos has 
achieved greatness in all the virtues. But here 
we need to remember Aristotle's later admonition 
in 10.8 that "we must not think that the man who 
is to be happy will need many things .... Even 
with moderate advantages one can act virtuously .... 
and it is enough that we should have so much as 
that, for the life of the man who is active in
Aaccordance with virtue will be happy." No
11179a 1-2, 5-9, 12.
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doubt, then, Aristotle intends his lecture on 
magnificence solely for those like his student 
Alexander who have the means to practice it.
The other virtues by contrast do not presuppose 
wealth; they are intended for everyone. As 
Aristotle says in 4-. 3* "those who without virtue 
have such goods [as upper class status, power, 
and wealthj are neither justified in making 
great claims nor entitled to the name of megalo- 
psychos, for these things imply perfect virtue."
♦ ♦ice#***#***##**###**
Aristotle leaves no doubt, therefore, that 
the megalopsychos is a man who exemplifies the 
moral virtues of his Nicomachean Ethics. In­
deed, as demonstrated, nearly all his descriptions
ppoint to this. But the key question remains:
What is this man's basic concern? Whatever it 
is we should expect it to be a great one.
Aristotle alerts us to this when he begins 4-.3 
by saying that "megalopsychia seems even from
11124a 27-28.
2To my knowledge, the above is the first 
detailed demonstration of this.
its name to be concerned with great things."
He concludes 4.3 by saying that "megalopsychia, 
then, is concerned with honor on the grand scale, 
as has been said." We seem, then, to have good 
reason to conclude that honor, externally 
bestowed, is the basic concern of 4.3, and 
hence of the megalopsychos himself.
There are problems with such a con­
clusion however. Most notable is the fact that 
oi/V-c ITee) Tif/'nv ou'rcos €xei ,  
cjs (((/f/ ifo'/ oV , "indeed, not even honor does
he [the megalopsychos] hold as being the
/greatest thing." He will be f(€~r^{(/JS
C /
7}0~@ 7l g~£.~T'cK I , "moderately pleased," at
p"great honors conferred by good men," but 
this we would expect from a man who practices 
the virtue of right ambition. And if receiving 
such honors were a basic concern, we would 
expect him to be more than just "moderately 
pleased." As Grant notes, Aristotle ostensibly 
"fixes external honor as the object with which
'I'1124a 16. My translation.
^1124a 5-6o
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megalopsychia deals, "but then afterwards sets
Ait above all external honor."
Because the megalopsychos possesses 
"a character that suffices to itself,"
Aristotle has told us, he is "one who will 
possess beautiful and profitless things rather 
than profitable and useful ones." This is the 
quality of the man who asks for nothing or 
scarcely anything, but gives help readily.
This is the quality of the man who does not 
"aim at the things commonly held in honor, or 
the things in which others excel," the man who 
cares not to-be praised, who is "unable to make 
his life revolve round another, unless it be a 
friend, for this is slavish." This is the man 
who can regard the honor his fellow man gives 
him as a definite and valid good, but not enough 
to be a basic concern. is too self-sufficient 
to hold any external good as a very great thing, 
"not even honor" which is the greatest of such 
goods.
^Ethics of Aristotle, 1:74-.
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Jaeger, tracing the evolution of the 
concept of honor in Greek culture, writes that 
"the Homeric man estimated his own worth ex­
clusively by the standards of the society to 
which he belonged. He was a creature of his 
class: he measured his own arete^by the opinion
which others held of him .... Homer and the 
aristocracy of his time believed that the denial 
of honor due was the greatest of human tragedies." 
But later philosophy, Jaeger tells us, "bade 
man obey an inner standard: it taught him to
regard honor as the external image of his own 
inner valuereflected in the criticism of his 
fellows."^
It is not that the earlier attitude 
toward honor was non-existent in the fourth 
century B.C. Early in the Hicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle observes that "men seem to pursue 
honor in order that they may be assured of their 
goodness." But this is not Aristotle’s view; 
rather he bids man to regard honor as the "ex­
ternal image of his inner value." Megalopsychia
1Paideia. 1:9. 21.5 1095b 27-
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is impossible, he tells us, without kalokagathia,
a concept best rendered by "moral nobility,”
"noble goodness,” or "honorable goodness."
Thus, when the megalopsychos accepts honor, it
is for a goodness and self-worth already
achieved; it would be uncharacteristic of him
to seek a sense of self-worth from external
honor. This would constitute an inversion.
As Aristotle remarks in his Politics
does not "acquire or preserve virtue by the
help of external goods [such as honor], but
2external goods by the help of virtue.
The fact that the megalopsychos 
possesses kalokagathia elucidates two other­
wise conflicting claims of Aristotle in 4.5:
a) "it is especially with honors and dishonors ... 
that the megalopsychos is concerned,"'* and
b) "not even honor does he hold as being the 
greatest thing." The first refers to the
^1124a 5« "Moral nobility" is H. 
Rackham’s rendering in his translation of the 
Nicomachean Ethics for the Loeb Classical Library.
21$25b 1.
^1 substitute "especially" for the Oxford 
"chiefly," as the better rendering of
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megalopsychos1s proper and specific concern 
with the greatest of external goods, honor. The 
second tells us that, for the megalopsychos, 
honor is not the greatest of goods in general.
The "especial" concern of the megalopsychos with 
external honor is simply that it not be given 
too much importance. I have found this no­
where better expressed than in the following:
... Megalopsychia can scarcely be said to 
be concerned with honor at all, still less 
with the other external goods. Why, then, 
does Aristotle begin by suggesting that it 
is? The megalopsychos is concerned with 
external goods only in so far as he has a 
right attitude towards them; and this is 
surely only a consequence of his megalo­
psychia,. not megalopsychia itself. That 
is, his lack of concern with external 
goods stems from his awareness of the superior 
value of his own goodness; and it is that 
awareness, not his attitude towards other 
goods as such, which makes him megalo­
psychos. '
If, then, the megalopsychos is not 
basically concerned with the greatest of ex­
ternal goods, honor, with what is he basically 
concerned? How are we to fill the gap left by 
Aristotle's claim that "not even honor does he 
hold as being the greatest thing"? Granted
1 'C . J. Howe, The Eudemian and Hicomachean 
Ethics: A Study in the development of Aristotle's
Thought (n„p.: The Cambridge Philological Society,
'V97't5 p . 50 (hereafter cited as Eowe, Development 
of Aristotle *s Thought)•
[
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that h e ’’thinks himself worthy of great things, 
"being worthy of them,” what great things?
A clue to Aristotle's answer can be 
seen at the end of 4.3 where he sneaks of those 
who are small of soul. "Each class of people 
aims at what corresponds to its worth," he 
says, and the basic failure of those who are 
micropsychos is that they "stand back even from 
noble actions and undertakings deeming them­
selves unworthy, and from external goods no
'Iless." Y/hat this implies is that the "great 
things" at the beginning of 4-.3 refers to great 
actions. We -can infer the same from Aristotle's 
criticism of the self-inflated man. They are 
"fools and ignorant of themselves," Aristotle 
says, "and that manifestly, for, not being worthy 
of them, they attempt honorable undertakings,
pand then are found out."
That the good man concerns himself with 
noble undertakings is Aristotle's emphasis 
throughout the Njcomachean Ethics. He 
repeatedly stresses that the end of virtue is
1112,6a 26-27. 21125a 28-29.
1not external honor, but the good and the noble. 
For no one is this more true than for the per­
son great in all the virtues, the megalopsychos. 
Thus, as a courageous man, Aristotle indicates 
in 3-7, the megalopsychos would face fearful 
things "as he ought and as the rule directs, for 
the sake of the noble,To0 £v'CA'<X» for this
is the end of virtue." Later, in 4.1, Aristotle 
repeats that "virtuous actions are noble and 
done for the sake of the noble." In 9.8, he 
identifies the good man as one who "chooses 
nobility before all else"; in 1.8 he says that 
"the man who- does not rejoice in noble actions is
pnot even good."
The evidence is clear: The megalo­
psychos is a man basically concerned with great 
actions oerformed for the sake of the noble.
But my thesis is that he performs these actions 
to enhance the nobility of his own soul. To see 
that this further inference is justified we need
^For some examples: 3*7 1115b 14, 22-23, 
3.12 1119b 17, 4.1 1120a 23, 4.2 1122b 6.
21169a 33, 1099a 18.
y?
again to go outside of 4.3.
In 2.1 Aristotle tells us that "states
y\of character arise out of like activities:1'
Noble actions, then, produce nobility of soul, 
and great noble action great nobility of soul. 
Aristotle makes clear that this is a personal 
concern of the megalopsychos in 9-8 in his essay 
on the love that a good man has for himself.
He says:
... if a man were always anxious that he 
himself, above all things, should act 
justly, temperately, or in accordance with 
any other of the virtues, and in general 
were, always to try to secure for himself 
the honorable course, no one will call such 
a man a lo.ver of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the 
other a lover of self; at all events he 
assigns to himself the things that are 
noblest and bestT2
It is no surprise, then, that Aristotle 
reminds us in 10.7 that "from practical 
activities we gain more or less apart from the 
action."^ This provides the third element of 
my thesis. The megalopsychos is basically
11103b 22. See also 3-5 1114a 9-11.
^1168b 25-30. Emphasis added.
^1177b 2-*3« In contrast to contemplation which is loved "for its own sake."
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concerned with: 1) great actions, 2) for the
sake of the nobility, 3) of his own soul. That 
is, the megalopsychos is a man whose basic con­
cern is to enhance the nobility of his soul 
through a life of moral action. His basic con­
cern is not externally bestowed honor, but the 
nobility of his soul and the inner sense of honor 
which is its concomitant. This is the person 
in Aristotle's theory of friendship who is "his 
own best friend" and loves "himself best."
This is the man who takes "delight in his achieve-
/iments" and who knows "no regrets." Three 
times in 4.3' this is the man "to whom nothing
pis great."
* * * * it***************
We now have a vantage point from which 
to return to the question: Is Aristotle
justified in his belief that megalopsychia is 
an independent virtue? Jaeger, we saw, denies 
megalopsychia independent status as a virtue 
because it presupposes the other virtues and is
19.8 1168b 8-9, 9.4- 1166a 25, 29.
21123b 33, 1125a 3, 15.
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in some sense an ornament to them. "Megalo- 
psyehia seems to be a sort of crown of the vir­
tues," -Aristotle affirms, "for it makes them
/]greater, and it is not found without them.’1 
It is necessary, therefore, to reconcile the 
above interpretation of the megalopsychos with 
this well-known passage.
I want to begin by pointing out that 
Aristotle makes two distinct points in the 
"crown" statement: megalopsychia is not found
without the other virtues, and megalopsychia 
makes the other virtues greater. The meaning of 
the first is-clear. We saw that megalopsychia is 
not possible without kalokagathia, without great­
ness in all the virtues.
But the meaning of the second is ĵust as 
clear. Megalopsychia "makes the other virtues 
greater" precisely because the primary concern 
of the megalopsychos is to enhance the nobility 
of his soul through moral action. Those who 
deny the independent status of megalopsychia
'1/H24a 1.
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focus on the crown passage's first point and 
neglect the second. But so narrow a focus is 
justified only on the mistaken notion that the 
megalopsychos is primarily concerned with ex­
ternally bestowed honor. According to that 
notion* megalopsychia is seen as a "virtue" 
after the fact; the megalopsychos has achieved 
greatness in all the virtues, and now his 
primary concern is to get from his fellow man 
the honor he deserves. Not only does this view 
do violence to 4-.3» it fails to square with 
Aristotle’s general view of the good life.
Happiness, Aristotle repeatedly stresses, 
is an activity. As such, the megalopsychos1s 
happiness does not leave him inclined to rest 
on his laurels. Yes, he delights in his achieve­
ments and he knows no regrets. But life for 
Aristotle is dynamic, and an individual's life 
is always in movement. Spiritually, there is 
no standing still: one either advances or one
falls back. Aristotle is quite clear about this. 
He tells us that virtues "tend, and by their own 
nature, to the doing of the acts by which they
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SIare produced.1' And again: It is more
characteristic of virtue "to do what is noble
pthan not to do what is base." Aristotle makes 
clear, in his many descriptions of the raegalo- 
psychos carrying into action the moral virtues/ 
of his Nicomachean Ethics« that for no man are 
these statements more true.
Ear from undercutting megalopsychia1s 
independent status as a virtue, then, the 
"crown" passage underscores it: It is because
he possesses the other moral excellences that 
the megalopsychos has the self-respect to 
"think himself worthy" of further great action, 
the action that will further enhance the nobility 
of his soul. This is the essence of megalo­
psychia.
13.5 1114b 28. 24.1 1120a 13.
CHAPTER II
THE PLACE OF MEGALOPSYCHIA 
IN ARISTOTLE ' S ETHI'CS
Ostensibly, 4.3 sets forth a man 
basically concerned with externally bestowed 
honor. It opens stating that the megalopsychos 
"thinks himself worthy of great things," it 
closes stating that "megalopsychia, then, is 
concerned with honor on the grand scale, as has 
been said." An open and shut case— it seems.
Yet it completely misses the essence and the 
spirit of Aristotle's megalopsychos. Any 
interpretation that starts from the premise that 
the megalopsychos is primarily concerned with 
externally bestowed honor will fail to capture 
his essence.
It will also fail to see the rela­
tionship of megalopsychia to the rest of 
Aristotle's ethical thinking. Important here 
is what one makes of the relationship between 
EN 4.3 and 4.4, the chapter that deals with
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right ambition. This is the virtue, Aristotle 
tells us, "which would appear to be related to 
megalopsychia as generosity is to magnificence.
For neither of these has anything to do with the 
grand scale, but both dispose us as is right
Awith regard to middling and unimportant objects."
Even more important is the fact that 4.4, this
chapter on right ambition, does not appear in
the earlier Eudemian Ethics. What is the
relationship of EN 4.3 and M  4.4, and why is a
separate chapter on right ambition absent in the
earlier version of Aristotle's ethics? How one
answers these questions have major implications
for a wider question: What is the relation of
4.3 to the rest of Aristotle's ethical thinking?
There is no better demonstration of this
than in the work on magnanimity by the contemporary
French philosopher, Rene'” Gauthier. In his monu-
omental work by that title, and in his later
14.4 1125b 2-7.
%IagnanimitfT. L' ideal de la grandeur 
dans la philosophicJoaienne et dans la theologie 
cretienne (Paris: Bib1iotheque~Thomiste,
’SSTTfl j 1’951)» hereafter cited as Gauthier, Magnanxmite'.
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commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Gauthier 
explicitly addresses these questions. In 
light of the sheer comprehensiveness of his work, 
no study of megalopsychia would be complete 
without a mention of him. This is especially 
so in my case since his interpretation of 
Aristotle's megalopsychos stands in profound 
opposition to mine. G-authier assumes that the 
object of megalopsychia is great honor, and 
develops the view that the megalopsychos is a 
theoretikos. He bases his case to a large ex­
tent on what he takes to be the relationship of 
EH 4.5 and 4*4, and on what he sees as the 
reason for the absence of 4.4 in the Eudemian 
Ethics.
Gauthier begins by calling attention to 
Aristotle's distinction between small and great 
honor. He claims that the former, in Aristotle's 
mind, is rendered by the masses for moral virtue,
v ^R. A. Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, L'Sthique
a Nicomaque. Introduction, traduction et 
coinmentaire, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Louvaine: Pub­
lications universitaires, 1970; hereafter cited 
as Gauthier, Commentaire). Although this work 
appears to be a joint effort, both in translation 
and in commentary, all my references will be to Gauthier alone.
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the latter for intellectual virtue. Aristotle, 
he points out, regards all in the domain of 
action as insignificant when measured against 
the life of theoria. From this Gauthier deduces 
that 4.3, whose concern is great honor, is a 
treatise on the theoretikos, and that 4.4, whose 
concern is small honor, is a treatise on the 
practlkos.
This explains, Gauthier believes, why
4.4 is absent in the Budemian,Ethics.
Aristotle’s thinking, he says, was confused 
at the time he wrote EE 3-5» the Budemian 
chapter on megalopsychia. He was trying to 
synthesize two types of megalopsychia: the
megalopsychia of the practikos which involves a 
refusal to bear insult, and the megalopsychia 
of the theoretikos which involves impassibility 
before the vicissitudes of fortune. As Gauthier 
points out, Posterior Analytics 2, written at 
the same time as the Budemian Ethics. indicates 
that Aristotle was aware of these two common
^Magnanimite'', p. 113« He cites EH-
10.8, 11?8bl7I
■>]significations of megalopsychia. But 3-5 
fails to synthesize them. As it turns out, 
the megalopsychos suffers from not receiving 
the honor he merits, and this conflicts with
phis supposed impassibility before ill fortune. 
Later when Aristotle writes the Nicomachean 
account of megalopsychia, he follows it with 
a chapter on right ambition in order to avoid 
repeating that failure. By accounting for the 
mega.lopsychia of the practikos in 4.4, he leaves
4.3 to develop exclusively the megalopsychia 
of the theoretikos.^
Now Gauthier's reconstruction certainly 
has the merit of coherence. However, the critical 
issue is: Is the Nicomachean megalopsychos
a theoretikos. as Gauthier claims? Gauthier 
is convinced that he is. If we examine 4.3, 
he says, we find that the life of the raegalo-
^Post. Anal. 2.13 97b 16-25- Gauthier, 
a g n a n i m i t e .114■> places the time of these 
writings in the middle period of Aristotle's 
life, during his stay in Assos, 348-347*
2See 1232b 13.
%agnanimite, pp. 113-114.
psychos is a life of leisure. His life in­
volves idleness, for he is a man of few actions. 
He is slow to act except when great issues or 
great honors are at stake. We know that he 
delays, decides slowly, does not readily ex­
pose himself to risks, is not ambitious for 
high public position. In short, Gauthier de­
clares , II n* a rien de 1 1 allure d'un homme 
&'action, "He has nothing of the style of a man 
o f action.11 Instead, he is slow of step,
has a deep voice, and level utterance, and he
2is not easily excited. Gauthier's conclusion: 
Le magnanime est done essentiellement homme de 
loisir, "Thus the megalopsychos is essentially 
a man of leisure."^ And that implies, Gauthier 
says, that he is a philosopher. As he puts it: 
II ne manque pas de serieuses raisons de penser 
qu'en fait le philosophe est bien le seul a 
pouvoir etre magnanime, "There is no lack of 
serious reasons for thinking that, in fact, the
1Ibid., p. 109. 24.5 1125a 14-15.
% agnanimite\ p. 109*
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1philosopher alone is able to be megalopsychos.11 
His life is one of few actions, and "if the 
megalopsychos spends his life neither producing 
nor taking action, for what end would he then
pspend it except contemplation."
Aristotle does indeed tell us that the 
megalopsychos is "a man of few deeds, but of 
great and.notable ones."^ This, understandably, 
is one of Gauthier's major citations, and there- 
fore it is necessary that any interpretation 
of the megalopsychos as a practikos accounts for 
it.
First of all, we need to note that 
Aristotle immediately precedes it with: "It
is characteristic of the megalopsychos not to 
aim at the things commonly held in honor, or 
the things in which others excel; to delay and 
to hold back except where great honor or a 
great work is at stake." A few lines later
1 ^Magnanimite. p. 112, Commentaire, 2:290.
pIbid. This is precisely the way 




Aristotle adds that "the man who takes few 
things seriously is not likely to he hurried, 
nor the man who thinks nothing great to be 
excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait 
are the results of hurry and excitement*"
What these statements indicate is that 
the megalopsychos does not squander his 
energy on unimportant pursuits; he does not 
hurry after things commonly but mistakenly held 
in honor, such as wealth and power. Aristotle, 
then, describes the megalopsychos as a man of 
few actions to make vivid his contrast with 
shallow men.- It comes as no surprise, there­
fore, that Aristotle's moral virtues, excluding 
magnificence, are only ten in number. They are 
few, and they require relatively few actions 
for their implementation. Thus in a chapter as 
brief as 4.3 Aristotle is able to describe the 
megalopsychos implementing them all, and this 
includes right ambition. As a result, the 
separation that Gauthier imposes between 4.3 
and 4.4 simply does not exist. Gauthier's
11125a 13-16.
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statement that the megalopsychos "has nothing 
of the style of a man of action" is clearly less 
than plausible.
Consistent with his view that 4.5 deals 
essentially with a man of leisure, is Gauthier's 
belief that the great things of which the 
megalopsychos thinks himself worthy are great 
honors, not great action. How does Gauthier 
reconcile this belief with Aristotle's criticism 
of the micropsychos— not for shunning great 
honors— but for standing back from noble action 
and undertakings? He answers:
There is here a slip, un glissement, 
in Aristotle's thinking: the expression
"to Judge oneself unworthy of" has always, 
up to now, had exterior goods as its ex­
clusive object (cf. especially 1125b 17) J 
that of which the megalopsychos Judges 
himself worthy, are exterior goods; as to 
great acts of virtue, the megalopsychos 
does not Judge himself worthy of them, he 
should already have achieved them in order to 
have the right to Judge himself worthy of 
exterior goods. In other words, great 
acts of virtue are a precondition of 
megalopsychia, whereas exterior goods are 
the object of them. If Aristotle re­
mained faithful to that conception, small­
ness of soul would have to consist of ac­
complishing great acts of virtue, and in 
not Judging oneself worthy of the exterior 
goods of which one is therefore worthy.
On the contrary, it here consists essentially 
for Aristotle in not accomplishing great
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acts of virtue, because one judges oneself 
unworthy of them. This slip of thought 
comes, it appears, from an equivocation 
on the expression ..., "to judge oneself 
unworthy of": Aristotle gives to it, when
he is concerned with megalopsychia, the 
meaning of "to think that one has a right 
to," whereas, when he is concerned with 
•smallness of soul, he permits to it the 
meaning that the common people used: "to
think that one-is capable of." In other 
words, Aristotle did not take the trouble 
to conduct his treatment of vice with the  ̂
same thorough effort that he gave to virtue.
It is obvious why Gauthier must take 
such pains to establish that it is great honors, 
not great actions, of which the megalopsychos 
thinks himself worthy. If the "thinks himself 
worthy" passage refers to great actions, then 
it clearly presents a major stumbling block 
to Gauthier's argument that the megalopsychos 
is a theoretikos. Yet only by recognizing that 
this indeed _is Aristotle's meaning do his 
criticisms of the micro-psychos and the self­
inflated in terms of deficiency and excess of 
action make sense. This recognition is surely 
preferable to Gauthier's accusation that 
Aristotle slipped up in his thinking.
^Commentaire. 2:297-298.
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How then are we to explain the absence 
of a chapter on right ambition in the Eudemian 
Ethics and the need for it in the Nicomachean?
The answer is far more direct than Gauthier’s.
What is evident when we look at these two ver­
sions of megalopsychia are two markedly dif­
ferent attitudes toward honor. EE 3»5 makes 
clear that the megalopsychos's basic concern 
is honor. "As to the accepted objects of human 
interest, honor, life, wealth,” says Aristotle,
"he is thought to care nothing about any of them 
except honor; it would grieve him to be dishonored
and ruled by.someone unworthy, and his greatest
ajoy is to obtain honor."
Furthermore, Aristotle makes clear that 
this concern is specifically for the honor that 
accompanies such things as high office. "In 
reality," Aristotle says, "those offices and 
other good things are honorable and worthy of 
serious pursuit that are truly great." Then,
A1252b 11-13. Rackham translation.
^1252b 23.
in discussing the micropsychos % Aristotle .
indicates that another of these "good things"
is a noble birth. "Nobody would call a nan
microps.ychos," he says, "for not claiming to
hold office and submitting to authority if
he is a resident alien, but one would do so if
he were of noble birth and attached great im-
'Iportance to office."
In contrast to this is 1  4.3 where the 
megalopsychos is again concerned with honor, but 
with crucial differences: Aristotle emphasizes
that the honor is bestowed for virtue, and that 
for the megalopsychos "not even this honor is the 
greatest thing." While the Nicomachean megalo- 
psychos is "moderately pleased" at the honor he 
receives, the Eudemian finds his "greatest.joy" 
in it. As one commentator concludes: "Aristotle
has apparently changed his mind about the im­
portance of external goods as such; and, as a 
consequence, he reaches a quite different con-
'l1233a 28-30.
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Aelusion about the nature of megalopsychia."
It is because of this that 4.4 malces its ap­
pearance in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The middling and the small which are the 
concern of philotimia can only be external 
goods, i.e. to use Aristotle's own examples, 
power ... and wealth, l^hese may be great 
of their kind, but the honor which accrues 
from them is small when compared with the 
honor with which the megalopsychos is 
(supposedly) concerned, that is, the honor 
which is accorded to virtue. Philotimia, 
then, is defined as the right pursuit of 
external goods. If this is so, we can see 
at once why there is no mention of the vir­
tue of philotimia in the Eudemian Ethics; 
there, external' goods fall within the sphere 
of megalopsychia itself.2
G-authier, in contrast, is bound to mis­
construe the actual relation of 4.4 to 4.3 
if for no other reason than that he misconstrues 
the meaning of.each chapter separately. Aristotle 
tells us that megalopsychia "seems even from its
Rowe, Development of Aristotle’s Thought. 
p. 50* As Rowe points out, while the Eudemian 
and Nicomachean treatments of most of the moral 
virtues are substantially the same, megalopsychia 
is an important exception.
pIbid., p. 51. The author uses philotimia 
to stand for the virtue (which I render by the 
traditional "right ambition"), while in the text 
philotimia stands for the vice. He uses it, for 
convenience, for the virtue, he says, because 
Aristotle himself has no name for it.
name to be concerned with great things*" Con­
cerning 4-.4-, therefore, we need to ask Gauthier: 
Since Aristotle expressly says that 4-.4- has 
nothing "to do with the grand scale," how does 
he justify assigning to it the subject of the 
megal'onsychia of the practikos? Aristotle has 
implicitly prohibited this.
Concerning 4*3 we need to ask Gauthier:
Is megalopsychia an intellectual virtue, or is 
it a moral virtue that only the theoretikos 
can practice? It is difficult to pin Gauthier 
down on this question. "There is no lack of 
serious reasons," he has said, "for thinking 
that, in fact, the philosopher alone is able to 
be megalopsychos." If Gauthier is saying that 
only the theoretikos can be megalopsychos, and 
this seems to be his meaning, then he is saying 
that if a man is a megalopsychos, he. is a 
theoretikos.
But, as if anticipating this implication, 
Gauthier, in the same place as the quotation 
just recalled, hedges. "Megalopsychia," he 
quickly adds, "is assuredly a moral virtue—
never doubt it— even if this moral virtue, by 
its particular nature could in fact be practiced 
only through the contemplative life of the
Aphilosopher.11
So G-authier does give a definite answer 
to* the above question; he explicitly states 
that megalopsychia is a moral virtue. But this 
only raises another difficulty for G-authier. 
Shortly after saying that the "moral11 virtue, 
megalopsychia, by its particular nature could be 
practiced only through philosophic contemplation, 
he says: Ni la production ni 1 Action ne sont
le domaine du magnanime, "Neither production 
nor action are the province of the megalopsychos. 
Yet somehow he is able to practice a moral virtue 
This is not an isolated statement. Nineteen 
years earlier, Gauthiers view was the same:
II n ^  rien de 1 1 allure d'un homme diction,
"He [the megalopsychos]] has nothing of the style 





But then we must ask Gauthier what 
sense it makes to say that megalopsychia is a 
moral virtue? He explicitly states that meg- 
alopsychia is a moral virtue, hut leaves the 
megalopsychos with no means to practice it: 
action.
Gauthier's oscillations aside, it is 
possible to view his position as an attempt, 
via the megalopsychos. to bridge the gap 
produced by Aristotle's bifurcation of human 
life into two spheres, the intellectual and 
the moral. This is especially manifest in 
Gauthier's view that megalopsychia is a moral 
virtue that only the theoretikos can practice.
What if we amend Gauthier's extreme 
stand, however, and remove the "only"? Now we 
would have the position that megalopsychia is 
a moral virtue that the theoretikos as well as 
the practikos can practice. After all, Aristotle 
makes abundantly clear that moral virtue in­
volves the simultaneous practice of phronesis. 
an intellectual virtue. Since the megalopsychos 
is a phronimos, why not also a theoretikos?
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Before we can meaningfully answer this, 
however, there is a more fundamental question. 
Granted that the megalopsychos if a phronimos, 
is his basic concern with the moral life or the 
theoretical?
A number of recent commentators have 
observed that Aristotle's treatment of phronesis 
undergoes a significant alteration between the 
time he wrote the two versions of his ethics.
Stated briefly, the Nicomachean version limits 
phronesis to the moral sphere, whereas the 
Eudemian version permits it to encompass both 
the moral and intellectual spheres. And this is 
fully consistent with the general acceptance 
of the Eudemian Ethics as the earlier version, 
a work in'which Aristotle was closer to his Platonic 
beginnings. The use of phronesis to denote both 
practical and philosophic wisdom is a well known 
position of Plato. It was not until the later
/|Among them: Bartling, "Megalopsychia,"
pp. 186-201; W. Jaeger, Aristotle« Fundamentals 
of the History of His Development, trans. (from 
the 1923 1st ed. in German) R. Robinson, 2d ed. 
(London, 194-8), pp. 66-10*1, 232-246, cited and 
summarised as part of Bartling's account; Rowe, 
Development of Aristotle's Thought, pp. 63-72.
1
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Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle precisely 
sets phronesis apart as a technical concept 
referring solely to practical wisdom. The fact 
that the megalopsychos is a nhronimos then—  
instead of lending support to the doctrine that 
the megalopsychos could as easily be a theoret­
ikos as a practikos— -suggests the opposite 
conclusion.
Gauthier believes that a rapproachement 
between megalopsychia and theoria can be found 
in M  1.10. At 1100b 19, he notes, "the happy 
man will always do and contemplate. Oc(oP'nlr^  /« 
that which is in conformity with virtue.” And 
"it is interesting to note," Gauthier continues, 
that "it is this man who, several lines later, 
will be called megalopsychos (1100b 32)."^
But we must call Gauthier's suggested 
rapproachement into question. Aristotle states 
in 6.12 that "philosophic wisdom will contemplate 
none of the things that will make a man happy 
(for it is not concerned with any coming into
^Magnanimite, p. 106. In Ross's trans­
lation of this passage for the Oxford edition, 
this is the man who "bears with resignation many 
great misfortunes, not through insensibility to 
pain but through nobility and megalopsychia."
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Abeing)." Earlier, at 6.1, Aristotle says that 
the part of the soul which grasps a rational 
principle can be divided into two parts: "bne
by which we contemplate the kind of things whose 
originative causes are invariable, and one by
pwhich we contemplate variable things."
Clearly the former applies to EN. 10.7 and 10.8, 
while the latter applies to 1.10 where megalo­
psychia and theoria appear in the same context.
Nor is this an isolated instance; in 4.2 mag­
nificence and theoria also appear in the same
ze.context. The two types of theoria. then, are not 
to be conflated as Gauthier does.
•̂ oes this mean, then, that the life of 
the megalopsychos and the life of the theoretikos 
are mutually exclusive? If a man is megalopsychos, 
does that automatically bar him from the 
theoretical life? Aristotle hints that it does. 
When he cites Anaxagoras and Thales as practi-
11143b 19. 211S9a 5-8.
^At 1122a 34-35* "The magnificent man 
is like an artist; for he can see, what
if fitting and spend large sums tastefully."
Cited by Bartling, "Megalopsychia," p. 191.
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tioners of the theoretical life, he says:.
This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales and 
men like them have philosophic hut not 
practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant 
of what is to their own advantage, and why 
we say that they know things that are 
remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, 
but useless; vis. because it is not human 
goods that they seek.'l
No doubt, when Aristotle wrote this, he had in
mind Plato's playful reference to Thales as the
astronomer who fell into a well because his eyes
pwere fixed on the heavens. This anecdote
symbolizes Aristotle's later point that practical
endeavors can be impediments, £^7^057 to the
•x.life of theoria.̂
Yet, despite such considerations, how 
strictly would Aristotle have us keep separate 
the megalopsychos and the theoretikos? An 
answer to this involves addressing that peren­
nial question in Aristotelian scholarship: What
is the relationship between the moral and in­
tellectual spheres in Aristotle's ethics? Does 
the thesis that the megalopsychos is basically
16.7 "mib 3-8.
2Theaetetus 174. 5EN 10.8 1178b 5.
60
concerned to enhance the nobility of his soul 
through a life of moral action throw any light 
on this wider issue? I believe that it does.
The standard view is that in a life of 
eudaimonia, the "flourishing1' life, "intellectual 
values are made dominant, while moral activity 
is regarded as just a constantly necessary means 
to this dominant end." On this view, which 
has textual support, megalopsychia would be in
pthe service of theoria. But, as the just-cited.
commentator observes,
One might expect .... that in his [Aristotle1 sj 
delineation of the moral virtues some signs 
of this thesis would occasionally be visible, 
if he in fact accepted it. But such in­
dications as there are, one way or the other 
seem to tell against the hypothesis that 
Aristotle thought a morally virtuous 
character necessary for the fullest pos- , 
sible realization of intellectual values."’
This formulation, although not his own 
view, belongs to John M. Cooper, Reason and 
Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard
’University Press , '1975) » P» 153 (hereafter cited 
as Cooper, Human Good). In what follows, I 
adopt Cooper's very apt rendering of "eudaimonia” 
by the concept "flourishing."
2Cooper cites W  1.7 "1098a 16-18, 1.15 
11?7a 12-18, 6.7 1141a~20-22, 6.12 1143b 33-35«
^Cooper, Human Good, p. 108. See also 
pp. 108-110 for Cooper's”elaboration on this and 
on other considerations against the standard view.
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One might especially expect this of Aristotle 
somewhere in 4.3 where he spells out the in­
gredients of his moral ideal in such minute 
detail. But he does not.
However, by citing Aristotle's treatise 
on friendship in arguing my interpretation of 
4.3, it might appear that I have put the megalo­
psychos into the service of theoria. The 
megalopsychos, as a good man, I have pointed 
out, will always "seek for himself the things 
that are noblest and best.” How this occurs in 
a context where Aristotle identifies the person 
with nous. He writes:
He therefore who loves and indulges the 
dominant part of himself is a lover of self 
in the fullest degree ... the terms 'self- 
restrained' and 'unrestrained' denote being 
restrained or not by one's intellect, y 0 oys 
and thus imply that the intellect is the man 
himself. Also it is our reasoned acts that 
are felt to be in the fullest sense our own 
acts, voluntary acts. It therefore is clear 
that a man is or is chiefly the dominant part 
of himself, and that a good man values this 
part of himself most.'l
Does this not make a concern for the activity of
his mind the ultimate concern of the megalopsychos?
19.8 1168b 33-1169a 3» Rackham translation.
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And i f  so, does this not tell against the strict 
separation of the megalospychos and theoretikos 
at which we have seen Aristotle so strongly hint?
To decide the first question we need
to go back to the cited passage in which Aristotle
identifies the good man with his mind. In
doing so, v/e discover that Aristotle is
actually referring to the mind as employed in
a moral context.
As his ... identification of a person with 
his mind shows, he is thinking of a person 
as identical with that in him which properly 
ought to decide what he is to do and which 
controls and guides his inclinations and 
desires in their job of moving his limbs 
and generating actions— in short, vjlth his 
practical reason. The mind which is in con­
trol in the self-controlled man and out of 
control in the incontinent is the practical 
reason, whose virtue, phronesis, is said in 
the sixth book to consist' in issuing 
commands (11A5a 8). '
Thus, Aristotle’s identification of the good
man with his mind, in such a context, does not
provide a ground for making theoretical pursuit
Cooper, Human Good, p. 172. He also 
cites, p. 172, n« 24', 'two other passages, 9 
1166a 10-25 and 6.2 1159a 29-3^s that corroborate 
his analysis. It is only in Book 10, Cooper 
points out, that Aristotle identifies the person 
with theoretical mind. Cooper makes much of this 
fact in the position he ultimately arrives at con-
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the ultimate concern of the megalopsychos.
This of course would not rule out all 
such concern. Men such as Pericles, Solon, 
Socrates, granting that they are megalopsychoi, 
were no doubt concerned to advance, each in 
his capacity as_statesman (or gadfly), 
theoretical pursuits. Prom this perspective, 
we can readily see certain megalopsychoi serving 
as ’'political’* bridges between the moral and in­
tellectual spheres. It is here that those 
.passages in which Aristotle seems to regard 
moral activity as just the constantly necessary 
precondition.of theoretical activity might find 
their application.
Aristotle makes clear, however, that on 
the private level of the human individual the 
moral life flourishes quite independently of 
the theoretical. "In a secondary degree," he 
states, "the life in accordance with the other
cerning the relationship between the moral and 
intellectual spheres in Aristotle*s ethics.
See pp. 155-186.
■^Bartling, "Megalopsychia," p. 192, 
points this out iD connection with Pericles.
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kind of virtue [the moral] is happy, for the 
activities in accordance with this befit our 
human estate.” Where does the megalopsychos's 
basic concern, enhancing the nobility of his 
soul through moral action, fit into this type 
of life? It fits in as just that, a basic 
concern. His ultimate concern remains 
secondary-degree-eudaimonia, or moral flourish­
ing, while nobility of soul is a basic ingredient. 
Indeed, given Aristotle’s conception of megalo­
psychia, it is the basic ingredient of the 
morally flourishing life.
To what extent, then, might intellectual 
activity be a part of that life? If we look 
to 4-. 3, we can recall that the megalopsychos is 
a man of "few actions.” Although this does not 
permit Gauthier’s extreme inference, it does 
leave open the possibility that the megalo­
psychos would engage in theoretical activity should 
time permit. Likewise for the theoretikos; we 
have no reason to suppose that he would not in­
volve himself in moral pursuits. As Aristotle
110.8 1178a 8-9.
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stresses, in so far as he is human, he cannot
avoid them. At issue, as one commentator
sensibly puts it,
is not whether a given philosopher may, 
under unusual circumstances, exchange roles 
. with the man of supreme practical ac­
complishments. The question, rather, is 
what actions, however infrequent, are 
within the range of the normal and the 
expected for the ideal type of the 
theoretikos bios as described in Book X 
of the nicomachean Ethics.^
The theoretikos, he goes on to say, “is and remains
an ethical being. His minimal participation in
the ethikai aretai, however, does not win him the
title of megalopsychos. The megalopsychos, on the
other hand, could theoretically encroach on the
domain of the bio3 theoretikos without necessarily
becoming a full-fledged philosophos."^
Aristotle, then, sets forth two ideal 
types in his Nicomachean Ethics; the theoretikos 
of 10.7 and the megalopsychos of 4-. 3. Although 
we will not, in Aristotle’s view, find them em­
bodied, as types, in the same person, they might
110.8 1178a 26-27.
pBartling, "Megalopsychia,” p. 161.
5Ibid., p. 215.
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nevertheless partially engage in each other*6 
characteristic activities, given the right 
circumstances. But 4.3 does not support the 
standard view thab Aristotle sees moral activity 
as "just s constantly necessary means to in­
tellectual activity." Aristotle clearly grants 
the morally flourishing life, as exemplified by 
the megalopsychos, a separate status.
Of course, Aristotle stresses that such 
a life' is of less worth than the theoretically 
flourishing life. But I want-to stress that 
what we make of this difference, looking at the 
Nicomachean Ethics as a whole, is profoundly . 
affected by what we make of Aristotle's con­
ception of megalopsychia. If 4.3 gives us a 
man who is basically concerned with externally 
bestowed honor, which is the prevailing view, 
then Aristotle's megalopsychos is profoundly in­
ferior to his theoretikos. But if the megalo­
psychos is a man basically concerned, not with 
externally bestowed honor, but with the nobility 
of his soul, his self-respect, then his contrast 
with the theoretikos is strikingly lessened. In
6 7
short, I am urging that Aristotle's theory of 
moral good, as idealized and concretized in the 
person of his megalopsychos, has far greater 
importance in Aristotle's mind than the usual 
interpretations of 4.3 are able to admit.
Quite aside from this, however, it is not 
the content of 4.3, the type of actions, or 
activity, being described that is so important, 
as the fact that these actions, and the type of 
life to which they add up, are gauged to enhance 
one's nobility of soul, one's sense of honor— in 
short, one's self-respect. Aristotle's distinct 
achievement in 4.3 is that he identified the mean­
ing and championed the importance of moral 
enthusiasm. For Aristotle, there is more to 
the good life than simply avoiding evil. As 
he puts it: "It is more characteristic of vir­
tue to do what is noble than not to do what is 
base." For no virtue does he emphasize this 
more than for the virtue of megalopsychia.
CHAFTER III
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF MEGALOPSYCHIA 
AFTER ARISTOTLE
For those acquainted with 4.3's notorious 
"bad press, it comes as no surprise that Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia has had a negligible 
impact on later ethical thought.
"Magnanimity," the present day descendent 
of "megalopsychia," confirms this. Basically, 
all that "magnanimity" retains of Aristotle's 
"megalopsychia" is the generosity of mind to 
forgive and forget an injury.
What has happened to Aristotle's lofty 
conception of megalopsychia? Why has its in­
fluence been so negligible? Why does it, even 
today, receive a bad press?
This chapter will propose and explore 
three basic reasons. First, megalopsychia has 
been widely misunderstood. Second, those who 
did understand it, profoundly altered Aristotle's 
meaning. Third, megalopsychia, as an ideal,
6 8
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calls for a moral elite. Each of these reasons 
has taken its toll. Nevertheless, Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia, we shall see, con­
tinues its existence under a different name.
Of the misunderstandings, the fundamental 
one, I have repeatedly emphasized, is the idea 
that Aristotle's megalopsychos is a man primarily 
concerned with externally bestowed honor. Be­
cause of this idea he has been labeled a "stuffed 
shirt," a conceited, bad-mannered "prig," a 
man "divinely jealous of .his superiority," con­
cerned always to be "one up on his fellow man."
He has been found "unpleasing" because he does 
not abase himself "before the ideal of duty," 
even "intolerable." He has even been seen as 
a "strange incubus," enough to make one 
"shudder.
Such comments betray a superficial 
understanding of Aristotle's conception of 
megalopsychia. The superficiality lies in 
the failure to see beyond the surface appear­
ances of Book 4 chapter 5 of the Nicomachean
A•Above, pp. 5-8.
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Ethics, appearances that seem to make external 
honor the basic concern of the megalopsychos.
The many problems with this interpretation 
have been detailed already, and in its place 
I have argued that the megalopsychos's basic 
concern is to enhance the nobility of his soul 
through a life of moral action. That is, his 
concern is not with externally bestowed honor 
but with his sense of inner honor.
The failure to recognaize this is a 
fundamental misunderstanding underlying three 
others. One of them is that Aristotle is not 
really serious in his portrait of the megalo­
psychos. Another quite different misunderstand­
ing is that he is presenting the ideal man of the 
life of theoria, the theoretikos. Finally, 
it leads to the view that megalopsychia is not 
a separate virtue.
According to the first of these, 4-. 3 
is a piece of humor, with the second it is ir­
relevant to the moral life, and with the third 
it is insignificant. Since these views are by 
no means uncommon, it is understandable that
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Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia has had 
no real impact on later ethical thinking. 
Therefore, to better ensure the recognition it 
deserves, it is necessary to examine each of 
these misunderstandings.
The charge that Aristotle was not really 
serious in 4.3 has had a number of versions. Some 
commentators see it as a caricature, others as 
a piece of humor. Still others see it as 
satirical or half-ironical. To understand 
these notions we need to ask: About what, or,
better, about whom, was Aristotle being 
humorous or half-ironical?: Whom was he
caricaturing or satirizing? One commentator 
provides a clue when he says 4.3 reveals "that 
Aristotle had an undue admiration for the .upper- 
middle-class gentlemen of his day." Another is 
even more explicit. Aristotle's treatment of 
moral virtue, he declares, "presents a lively and 
often amusing account of the qualities admired
AAbraham Edel, Aristotle (New York:
Dell Publishing 0o., 1967) , p. 137•
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or disliked by cultivated Greeks of Aristotle's 
time."7*
We can infer from such statements, it 
appears, that, if there is an object of caric­
ature or satire in 4-.3, then it is the cultivated 
upper class of Aristotle's day. This .notion is 
the more easily adopted, of course, by those 
who see the megalopsychos as basically con­
cerned with external honor. For them the megalo­
psychos belongs to that class of men who, as 
Aristotle puts it, "seem to pursue honor in
order that they may be assured of their good- 
oness." When, on that basis, these same men 
make a claim to greatness of soul, they become 
preposterous. And when they affect the deep 
voice, level utterances, and unhurried steps 
of the man of 4-.3, they become all the more 
ridiculous and pompous.
To repeat, however, Aristotle's megalo­
psychos could impress a commentator this way
Ross, Aristotle, p. 202.
21.5 1095b 27. Above, p. 30.
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only were he first to misconstrue him as basically 
concerned with externally bestowed honor. But 
Aristotle, as we have already seen, clearly states 
that "those who without virtue have such goods 
[as those.of the upper class: power, wealth
and position^ are neither justified in making 
great claims nor entitled to the name of megalo­
psychos." And when he speaks of the megalo­
psychos' s deep voice, level utterances and 
unhurried steps, he is contrasting him with the 
man who, undoubtedly like many, of the upper 
class, dissipates himself and his resources on 
shallow pursuits. "The man who takes few 
things seriously," Aristotle suggests, "is not 
likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks 
nothing, great. to be excited, while a shrill 
voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry
Aand excitement."
Thus, even were it true that Aristotle 
is describing an upper class virtue, it cer­
tainly is less than clear that he is caricaturing 
or satirizing the practitioner of that virtue.
11125a 14-16.
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He emphasizes that goodness is the ground for 
megalopsychia, not upper class status, power, 
wealth or any other external good. But it does 
not even seem true that Aristotle is describing 
an upper class virtue. We have already seen that 
the qualities of the magnificent man are, among 
all the virtuous qualities described by Aristotle 
in his Nicomachean Ethics, the only ones that 
are not made a necessary part of the megalo-
Apsychos's personality. We must conclude, 
therefore, that the notion that 4.3 is in some 
way a piece of humor, specifically humor directed 
at the upper-class of Aristotle's time, cannot 
be taken seriously.
Implied by the claim that Aristotle is 
concerned with upper class virtues is an allied 
misconception. This is the notion that he was 
not original in his treatment of megalopsychia. 
However, if an accepted conception of megalo­
psychia were available to Aristotle, it seems 
that he was not aware of it. Scholars agree that 
Aristotle's logical works were earlier than his
AAbove, pp. 25-27.
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Nicomachean Ethics. Both the Posterior Analytics 
and the Rhetoric suggest that an accepted 
conception of megalopsychia did not exist in 
Aristotle's day. In the Analytics Aristotle cites 
two significations of megalopsychia: refusal
to bear insult, and impassibility in the face 
of ill fortune. In the Rhetoric Aristotle cites 
another: "magnificence." One further signif­
ication also existed in Aristotle's time: the
ability to bear an offense with composure. Y/e 
find this in a fragment of Democritus, in the last 
years of the 5th century and the first years of 
the 4-th. ̂
None of these qualities, however, is 
in the end adopted by Aristotle as definitive 
of megalopsychia. We must conclude, then, that 
the suggestion that Aristotle's conception of 
megalopsychia is not original, is less than 
plausible* Before Aristotle could have 
borrowed an accepted conception of megalopsychia,
11.9 1366b 15-19.
%)K, fr. 4-6. Cited by Gauthier, 
Magnanimity p. 18. I shall elaborate on these four significations of megalopsychia in the next 
chapter.
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an accepted conception had to exist. It clearly 
seems that one did not.
Here, however, is where one of Gauthier's 
insights becomes relevant. According to him, the 
formula, "to think oneself worthy of great things, 
being worthy of them," was a popular formula in 
Aristotle's day, not in connection with megalo-
"Ipsychia, but simply as a formula. Furthermore,
Gauthier says, the "great things" phrase seems
2to have referred to great actions.
Even more important in this context is 
that the megalopsycbos, in his basic concern 
to enhance the nobility of his soul, seems to 
be heeding Socrates's famous exhortation: "I
spend all my time going about trying to per­
suade you, young and old, to make your first 
and chief concern not for your bodies nor for 
your possessions, but for the highest welfare of
^Magnanimite^ p. 75« Gauthier points out 
that it was used by Demosthenes in For the Crown,
53, 297- pMagnanimite. pp. 76-78. But not for 
Aristotle, Gauthierclaims. In Gauthier's view, 




We have therefore two central elements 
of 4-.3? the "thinks himself worthy" passage, 
and the concern of the megalopsychos with the 
nobility of his soul, neither element originated 
by Aristotle himself. But what was original with 
Aristotle is that he made these elements part 
of the meaning of megalopsychia. Aristotle's 
crucial contribution is that it is the megalo­
psychos whose basic concern is with enhancing 
the nobility of his soul.
Between the writing of the two versions 
of his ethics, Aristotle radically altered his 
conception of megalopsychia. As we saw, the 
Eudemian megalopsychos is not concerned with 
honor bestowed for virtue, but rather with the 
honor that accompanies the possession of great 
external goods. Thus, there is no doubt that 
Aristotle changed his mind about the importance 
of external goods as such after he wrote his 
Eudemian Ethics. It would be most surprising
Apology, 30b. Trans. Hugh Tredennick 
in The Last Days of Socrates (Baltimore:
Penguin"iBooks Inc., 1959) •
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to find that this was a result of a change in 
the accented meaning of megalopsychia during this 
time frame. Such cultural changes require more 
time than that which elapsed between the writing 
of the Eudemian and the Nicomachean texts.
They also require the influence of,a thinker 
with Aristotle’s influence. V/e know of no such 
thinker. We must conclude then that Aristotle 
himself was the originator of the conception, 
that special amalgam of elements, that comes 
down to us in 4.3 .
Unlike those commentators who think that 
Aristotle was not really being serious (or 
original) in his presentation of megalopsychia, 
there are those such as Gauthier who think him 
so serious (and original) as to propose that 
he is actually presenting the theoretikos. As 
already mentioned, this misunderstanding, just 
as easily as the first, renders Aristotle's con­
ception of megalopsychia ethically irrelevant.
It requires, as we saw with Gauthier, that the 
"great things" of which the megalopsychos 
thinks himself worthy be taken to refer to great 
honor, and not as the text demands to great actions.
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It thereby perpetuates the mistaken notion that 
the megalopsychos is a man basically concerned 
with externally bestowed honor, a concern that, 
not surprisingly, has failed to capture the at=e 
tention of moral philosophers after Aristotle.
Furthermore, it leaves Aristotle's treat­
ment of the moral realm without an ideal. This 
is a significant loss indeed for, as pointed 
out, on the interpretation that Aristotle's 
megalopsychos is a man whose basic concern is 
to enhance the nobility of his' soul through 
moral action, the value of the flourishing moral 
life has far-greater importance in Aristotle's 
ethics than the usual interpretations of 4.3 
are able to grant. As a result, its potential 
for elucidating Aristotle's ethical thinking is 
drastically diminished. Again we witness the 
sad result of thinking that Aristotle's megalo­
psychos is a man motivated by the desire for ex­
ternally bestowed honor.
Another manifestation of this notion is 
the view that Aristotle's "megalopsychia'1 is not 
really a separate virtue but merely a sum of the
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other virtues. This view holds that megalo­
psychia is simply a reward for excellences al­
ready practiced, and, as in the two preceding 
views, the great things of which the megalo­
psychos thinks himself worthy are still honors, 
t aibeit honors bestowed by his fellow num for 
excellences of character. Recalling Jaeger 
here, "Aristotle does not believe megalopsychia 
to be an independent virtue like the others, but 
one which- presupposes them and is 'in a way 
an ornament to them.1" We saw above the problems 
with taking this narrow perspective on megalo- 
psychxa. The point here is that such a per­
spective, when adopted by commentators on 4.3? 
effectively reduces megalopsychia to insignif­
icance. It denies that megalopsychia has an 
independent province of its own. One achieves 
the other excellences and megalopsychia auto­
matically results. It is not an active, ongoing, 
positive character trait like the other virtues. 
That this renders megalopsychia insignificant 
needs no further evidence than the fact that
36-59.
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universal justice, the virtue that Jaeger con^
Afuses with megalopsychia on this point, has had 
no place in subsequent ethical thinking.
it********************
Despite all the misunderstandings to 
which 4-. 3 has been subjected, however, Aristotle's 
vision of a man basically concerned to enhance 
the nobility of his soul through a life of moral 
action has never been entirely obscured. For 
no two philosophers was this more the case 
than for Thomas Aquinas, probably the most in­
fluential of Christian thinkers, and, later, 
for Friedrich Nietzsche, the great spokesman of 
the antichrist. The interesting thing about 
Aquinas and Nietzsche is that these, the two 
thinkers who probably best understood the mean­
ing and the spirit of 4-. 3, even to the point of 
openly admiring it, nevertheless cannot, in 
retrospect, be regarded as champions of 
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia.
Aquinas's interpretation of 4-.3 con­
curs, basically, with that set forth above.
AAbove, pp. 10-11.
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Actually, his account is not really.an interpret­
ation at all, but rather a presentation of what 
he apparently takes to be quite obvious. For 
instance, in his Summa Theologies it appears 
obvious to Aquinas that the megalopsychos is a 
man of action. nA man is called megalopsychos,1* 
he says, "chiefly because he has the spirit for
Asome great act." And in his Commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics, he states: "A person seems
to be megalopsychos who thinks himself worthy 
of great things, viz., that he.may perform 
great deeds and that great things should happen 
to him when in fact he is worthy." He no doubt 
has in mind Aristotle*s criticism of micropsychia 
where Aristotle makes clear the action orient­
ation of the megalopsychos. In Aquinas*s words, 
"The small-souled person is one who refuses to
Second part of the second part, question 
129, article 1, reply, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates
& Washbourne, 1932). Hereafter, unless indicated 
otherwise, all citations from the Summa Theologica 
will be from the second part of the second part, 
and will be in the form S.T. 129, 1, reply.
pLecture 8, article 730, trans. C. I. 
Litzinger, O.P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,1964). Hereafter such citations will be in the 
form Commentary 8.736.
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strive after great accomplishments and aims at 
certain petty -undertakings when he is truly
/jcapable of what is great." Aquinas does not 
argue these points. For him it is merely a 
matter of looking at the text of 4.3 and citing 
them.
To Aquinas it is also obvious that the 
megalopsychos is not really concerned with ex­
ternal honor but rather with the internal stature 
of his soul. As Aquinas expresses it-, "There is 
nothing great for him among the things that can 
happen externally, because his whole life is busy
pwith internal goods, which are truly great."
Aquinas leaves no doubt that he admires 
Aristotle's megalopsychos. Nevertheless, he 
regards megalopsychia as a pagan virtue, 
needing baptism in the v/aters of Christian 
doctrine. This he does by attmepting to rec­
oncile megalopsychia with humility.
Aquinas attempts this reconciliation 
from a number of perspectives. First, in terms 
of action: "Humility restrains the appetite from
 ̂C omro ent ary. 8.740 . %bid. 10.777.
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aiming at great things against right reasons 
while megalopsychia urges the mind to great 
things in accord with right reason. Kence it 
is clear that megalopsychia is not opposed to 
humility: indeed they concur in this, that each
Ais according to right reason."
Second, Aquinas relates megalopsychia 
and humility in terms of emotions: "For Just
as it belongs to megalopsychia to urge the mind 
to great things against despair, so it belongs 
to humility to withdraw the mind from the -in­
ordinate desire of great things against pre-
psumption."
Third, he demonstrates the need for a 
two fold virtue of megalopsychia and humility by 
appeal to man's nature:
Now it has been stated above (I.-II.,
Q. LXI. , A. 2) that for those appetitive 
movements which are a kind of impulse toward 
an object, there is need of a moderating 
and restraining moral virtue, while for 
those which are a kind of recoil, there is 
need, on the part of the appetite, of a 
moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it 
on. "Wherefore a twofold virtue is,necessary 
with regard to the difficult good.^
^S.T. 161, 1, reply. ^162, 1, reply.
^161, 1, reply.
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Finally, Aquinas explains the need for 
both megalopsychia and humility from the per­
spective of his world view. "The reason why 
Christ chiefly proposed humility to us," he 
writes, "was because it especially removes the 
obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting 
in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual 
things, in which he is hindered by striving to
. Abecome great in earthly things."
Humility in all these citations is 
understood by Aquinas as a virtue guarding 
against presumption, the Greek concept of 
hubris. But'there is more to humility for 
him than this. Humility also means self- 
abasement. "In so far as it is a virtue," 
he writes, it "conveys the notion of a praise-
pworthy self-abasement to the lowest place."
And if we investigate further, we find that 
self-abasement is what Aquinas regards as the 
main meaning of humility. "Humility," he says, 
"regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, 
for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting
^161, 5» reply. . 2161, 1, reply.
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*himself to others.1'
Also significant for Aquinas's rec­
onciliation of megalopsychia and humility is 
the fact that, of the two virtues, humility 
in his view is by far the more important. In 
so far as it is the "foundation of the spiritual 
edifice," humility is the greatest virtue. He 
explains: "By way of removing obstacles ....
humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it 
expels pride, which God resisteth, and makes 
man submissive and ever open to receive the 
influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written 
(James IV 6)j God resisteth the proud. and
pgiveth grace to the humble."
The megalopsychos, Aquinas believes,
needs to realize that his greatness is not his
own achievement but a gift from God.
In man there is a quality of greatness 
possessed by God's gift, and a character­
istic defect which comes from the weakness
Ibid. Aquinas intensifies the aspect of 
self-abasement in his conception of humility in 
accepting Benedict's "Twelve Degrees of Humility" 
(see 161, 6, reply), Anselm's "Seven Degrees of 
Humility" (see 161, 6, reply), and Bernardos 
"Twelve Degrees of Humility" (see 162, 4, reply).
2161, 5, reply.
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of his nature, Megalopsychia therefore 
makes a man esteem himself worthy of great 
things through contemplating the gifts 
which he has from God, For example, if he 
has great virtue of mind, megalopsychia makes 
him strive to attain perfection in virtuous 
works; and similarly in the employment of 
any other good, for example, knowledge or 
fortunate circumstances. But humility 
makes a man belittle himselfyjby contemplating 
his own particular weakness.
Because of this inherent weakness, man
can accomplish nothing without God’s grace. He
cannot even prepare himself for the gift of grace
without God's help. He has to receive grace to
prepare his soul to receive grace. This doctrine
of intense determinism Aquinas takes-to the
point of predestination, although he still
talks of "free" choice.
... The predestined must necessarily be 
saved, yet by a conditional necessity, which 
does not do away with the liberty of choice ....
Man's turning to God is by free 
choice; and thus man is bidden to turn 
himself to God. But free choice can be 
turned to God only when God turns it ....
It is the part of man to prepare his soul, 
since he does this by his free choice. And 
yet he does not do this without the help 
of God moving him .... Even the good move­
ment of free choice, whereby anyone is pre­
pared for receiving the gift of grace,:.is 
an act of free choice moved by God ....
/|129» reply
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Man's preparation for grace is from God,  ̂
as mover, and from free choice, as moved*
*********************
Although Nietzsche nov/here makes direct
reference to 4-. 3, there is no lack of references
in his work to the expression "greatness of
soul." "Gracefulness," he tells us in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, "is part of the graciousness
2of the great-souled." In Beyond Good and Evil 
he recalls that "in the age of Socrates .... 
irony may have been required for greatness of 
soul."^
More important than these,, hovrever, 
is Nietzsche's connection of greatness of soul 
and love for the truth in The Antichrist. He
'IS.T. Part one: 23, 3» reply; part one
of the second part: 109» 6, reply; 112, 2,
reply; 112, 3> reply. Cited by W. T. Jones,
The Medieval Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace
E~World, 1969771?. 283.
pPart 2, sect. 13. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche (New York:
Yiking Press, Penguin Books, 1968). Hereafter, 
such citations will be in the form: Zarathustra
2.13.
%>art 6, sect. 212. (Cf. EN 4.3 1124b 30.) 
Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Beyond Good and Evil 
(New York: Random House’, Vintage Books ,""19"66) •
Hereafter such citations will be in the form:Beyond Good 6.212.
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writes: "At every step one has to wrestle for
truth; one has to surrender for it almost everything 
to which the heart, to which our love, our trust 
in life, cling otherwise. That requires greatness 
of soul: the service of truth is the hardest serv­
ice. What does it mean, after all, to have
Aintegrity in matters of the spirit." With 
this we recall that Aristotle introduces the 
megalopsychos in terms of his truthfulness, as a 
man "who thinks himself worthy of great things, 
being worthy of them."
In The Will to Power Nietzsche states that 
"greatness of soul cannot be separated from 
greatness of mind. For it involves independence; 
and without greatness of mind this should not
pbe permitted, as it causes mischief."'
But the passage that best indicates that
qSect. 50. Trans. Walter Kaufmann, The 
Portable Nietzsche.
^Sect. 984. Cited by Walter Kaufmann, 
Nietzsche: Philosopher. Psychologist. Antichrist.
4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton U'niversity Press,” 
197^)i P° 584 (hereafter cited as Kaufmann, Nietzsche).
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Nietzsche has captured the spirit of 4-. 3 is 
not one in which he explicitly uses the phrase 
"greatness of soul*" It is a passage in which 
he describes the "noble man": "It is some
fundamental certainty which a noble soul has 
about itself, something which is not to be 
sought, is not to he found, and perhaps, also, 
is not to be lost .... The noble soul has
y\reverence for itself." It is almost as if 
Nietzsche had Aris-totle's description of the 
self-love of the good man before him. "Such a 
man," we saw, "would seem more than the other a 
lover of self; at all events he assigns to him­
self the things that are noblest and best."
Kaufmann remarks that "Aristotle's con­
ception [of megalopsychialj apparently made a 
tremendous impression on Nietzsche." According 
to Kaufmann, "many of the provocative ideas 
he [Aristotle]] expresses so unprovocatively and 
dryly |in 4-.3J are fashioned into polemical ar­
rows in Nietzsche's works, especially in
^Beyond Good 9*287. Emphasis is in the 
original•
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1Zarathustra." Kaufman undoubtedly has in mind 
such intense exhortations as; "By my love and 
hope I beseech you; do not throw away the hero 
in your soul! Hold holy your highest hope! ... 
0?hu3 spoke Zarathustra."^ And; "You shall al­
ways be the first and excel all others; your 
jealous soul shall love no one, unless it be 
the friend— that made the soul of the Greek 
quiver; thus he walked the path of his great­
ness."^
Polemical arrows of a kind relevant 
to a discussion of Aristotle's "megalopsychia" 
also abound in Beyond Good and Evil, as when 
Nietzsche declares; "At the risk of displeasing 
innocent ears I propose; egoism belongs to 
the nature of a noble soul." And again when 
he flings into the face of a Christian culture 
the idea that "the feelings of devotion, self- 
sacrifice for one's neighbor, the whole morality 
of self-denial must be questioned mercilessly and
^Nietzsche, pp. 382, 384-.




Nietzsche would have the noble soul question 
the doctrine of grace as well.
The noble soul gives as it takes, from 
that passionate and irritable instinct of 
repayment that lies in its depth. The 
concept "grace" has no meaning or good 
odor inter pares [among equals}; there 
may be a sublime way of letting presents 
from above happen to one, as it were, and 
to drink them up thirstily like drops—  
but for this art and gesture the noble soul 
has no aptitude. Its egoism hinders it: 
quite generally it does not like to look 
"up"— but either ahead, horizontally and 
slowly, or down: 'It knows itself to. be at
sl height.2
But just as with Aquinas, Nietzsche's
kinship with Aristotle over megalopsychia breaks
down at a certain point. We find, for example,
when we explore further the egoism of Nietzsche's
"noble soul," that it involves more taking than
giving. In Nietzsche's view, the noble soul
possesses an
... unshakable faith that to a being such 
as "we are" other beings must be subordinate 
by nature and have to sacrifice themselves. 
The noble soul accepts this fact of its 
egoism without any question mark, also with-
^Zarathustra 2.$3-
pBeyond Good 9*265. Emphasis is in theoriginal.
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out any feeling that it might contain 
hardness, constraint, or caprice, rather 
as something that may be founded in the 
primordial law of things: if it sought
a name for this fact it would say, "it is 
justice itself."1
For those bothered by the exploitation 
that this passage sanctions, Nietzsche offers 
this justification. "'Exploitation' does not," 
he states, "belong to a corrupt or imperfect 
and primitive society: it belongs to the
essence of what lives, as a basic organic 
function; it is a consequence of the will to
ppower, which is after all the will to life."
Here we start to move into Nietzsche's 
metaphysics, and what we shall find is that, 
although Nietzsche rejects Aquinas's doctrine of 
grace, his metaphysics is every bit as determin­
istic as Aquinas's. For instance, when Nietzsche 
accounts for the origin of the noble soul, one 
of his formulations is:
The order of castes, the supreme, the 
dominant law, is merely the sanction of a 
natural order, a natural lawfulness of the
1Ibid.
^9-259. For Nietzsche's "will to power" 
doctrine see Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 178-555•
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first rank, over which no arbitrariness, 
no "modern idea" has any power. In every 
healthy society there are three types which 
condition each other and gravitate differently 
physiologically; each has its own hygiene, 
its own field of work, its own sense of per­
fection and mastery. Nature .... disinguishea 
the pre-eminently strong in muscle and 
temperament, and those, the third type, who 
excel neither in one respect nor in the other, 
the mediocre ones— the last as the great 
majority, the first as the elite.'
The members of this elite say of them­
selves "Imperfection .... is beneath us.” It 
is not that they seek to rule over others or 
to exploit them. As Nietzsche puts it, "They 
rule not because they want to but because they 
are; they are not free to be second." -And their 
exalted status "does not preclude their being the
pmost cheerful and the kindliest" of men.
Yet, any good they do, any virtue they 
practice, is no more their own achievement 
than for Aquinas's "predestined elect."
For every high world one must be born; 
or to speak more clearly, one must be cultiv­
ated for it: a right to philosophy— talking
that word in its great sense— one has only by
aThe Antichrist, sect. 57* As Kaufmann 
observes in"his Nietzsche, p. 596 n. 8, Plato 




virtue of one's origins; one's ancestors, 
one's "blood" decide here, too. Many 
gererations must have labored to prepare 
the origin of the philosopher; every one 
of his virtues must have been acquired, nur­
tured, inherited, and digested singly, 
and not only the bold, light, delicate gain 
and course of his thoughts but above all 
the readiness for great responsibilities, 
the loftiness of glances that dominate and 
look down, feeling separated from the crowd 
and its duties and virtues, the affable. 
protection and defense of whatever is 
misunderstood and slandered, whether it be 
god or devil, the pleasure and exercise of 
the great justice, the art of command, the 
width of the will, the slow eye that rarely 
admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves— '
Nietzsche's view of human nature is as
intensely deterministic as Aquinas's. All one
has to do is replace Aquinas's "divine grace"
with Nietzsche's "origins, ancestors and blood."
"It is simply not possible," states Nietzsche,
"that a human being should not have the qualities
and preferences of his parents and ancestors
in his body, whatever appearances may suggest
oto the contrary."
Can there be such a phenomenon, then, 
as moral nobility, as envisioned by Aristotle? 
Nietzsche answers: "There is only nobility by
birth and blood .... Y/here there is talk of
^Beyond Good 6.213 2Ibid., 9.264.
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'aristocrats of the spirit', there is usually 
no lack of reasons for keeping something secret 
For spirit alone does not make noble, rather 
something is required jto make noble the spirit» 
What is required? B l o o d H e r e  "blood” 
operates for Nietzsche the way "grace" does for 
Aquinas. For Aquinas, free will moves man to 
choose God's path, but it is God's grace that 
moves this "free" will. For Nietzsche, spirit 
moves the noble man, but it is blood that moves 
the spirit.
Both Aquinas and Nietzsche understand 
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia in 
theory, but disagree with Aristotle over what 
is needed for the embodiment of that conception 
in an actual person. Aquinas produces a 
metaphysics in which any good a man performs, 
any excellence he achieves, is, ultimately, 
a result of God's grace. He speaks of free 
will but it turns out to be a will exercised as 
a result of grace. Thus, a man's worth is no
^The Will to Power sect. 9^2. Cited 
by Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 505*
longer a product of his own moral achievement. 
Where Aristotle says the megalopsychos "thinks 
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of 
them," Aquinas says megalopsychia "makes a 
man esteem himself worthy of great things through 
contemplating the gifts he has from God."
The profound difference between Aristotle 
and Aquinas is further reflected in Aquinas's 
attempt to reconcile megalopsychia and humility. 
His attempt is clever, and even successful, 
so long as he limits the meaning of humility to 
the withdrawing of "the mind from the inordinate 
desire of great things against presumption.1’
Here he presents humility as a proper self­
estimate, and hence a necessary safeguard 
against hubris. But when Aquinas is not at­
tempting to reconcile humility and megalopsychia, 
he reveals what he takes to be the chief meaning 
of humility: self-abasement. As such, humility
stands in profound opposition to megalopsychia; 
it is the very characteristic that Aristotle 
identifies with micropsychia.
In contrast to Aquinas, one of the 
leitmotifs of Nietzsche's opposition to
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Christianity is his contempt for humility. As 
he correctly observes, it is a contempt that 
any Greek would share:
The Chinese have a proverb that mothers 
even teach children: siao-sin— "make your 
heart small! This is the characteristic 
fundamental propensity in late civilizations: 
I do-not doubt that an ancient Greek would 
recognize in us Europeans of- today, too, such 
self-diminution; this alone would suffice 
for us to "offend his taste."— *
Thus, we do not find Nietzsche's noble 
man attempting smallness of soul, as did 
Aquinas's. Rather he adopts the other vice 
Aristotle opposes to megalopsychia: self­
inflation. For Nietzsche the noble soul "knows 
itself .to be at a height," has an unshakable 
faith that to a being such as he is "other 
beings must be subordinate and ... sacrifice 
themselves," and says that imperfection is 
beneath him. Even apart from Nietzsche's 
metaphysics these passages clearly smack of 
what Aristotle would call self-inflation. When 
considered in light of Nietzsche's view that 
the person they laud is a product— not of his 
own efforts— but of a "natural order," and of
^Beyond Good 9*267*
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"ancestors** and of "blood,” then they begin to
qborder on blatant pomposity.
Both Aquinas and Nietzsche grasped the 
meaning and spirit of but elaborated and
embellished it, each in his own way. In so do­
ing, each of them abandoned the mean struck by 
he who "thinks himself worthy of great things, 
being worthy of them." Each was pushed away from 
this mean by a metaphysics and view of human 
nature profoundly opposed to Aristotle's. One 
ended up advocating self-inflation, the other 
micropsychia. One advocated a caste of superior 
beings sanctioned by the natural order of things, 
the other an elite corp of predestined elect 
also sanctioned by the natural order of things. 
Both altered Aristotle's vision of a moral elite, 
of what Nietzsche refers to with derision as
Nietzsche himself was guilty of this, 
most clearly in Ecce Homo. As Kaufmann ob­
serves in his Nietzsche, p. 117: "To be sure,
in Ecce Homo Nietzsche attempts what might be 
called a deliberate self-mythologization; 
some of his statements obviously make no claim 
to literal correctness; and poetic license is 
in places extended beyond all boundaries of 
reason and good taste."
r
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an "aristocracy of the spirit.1'
Nietzsche is not alone in finding this 
conception offensive. By its very nature, 
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia sets 
up a standard for the few. This brings us to 
the third reason for its negligible influence 
in later ethical thinking.
"It is hard to be truly megalopsychos,"
Aristotle'admits, "for it is impossible without
kalokagathia." It thus stands as a reproach to
those who do riot measure up to its demands.
Sometimes they will sink to calling that good an
evil. One recent philosopher alludes to this
phenomenon as follows:
Pride is immanent in the prance of health 
and of intelligence, as in the employment 
of any talent or skill. More, the exercise 
of a natural faculty can be censured as a 
piece of insolence: the mere enjoyment of
the body or the mind takes you across the 
limits of what someone, rightly or wrongly, 
considers your proper sphere. To kick up 
your heels in exuberance is to fling sand 
in somebody's eyes. To wear bright clothes 
in the vicinity of a funeral is to offend 
the mourners— -who may resent the very ex­
istence of a healthy person as an insult 
to the dead .... Living is an affirmation 
and can be taken as an affront. ‘
'iArnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and
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An even more explicit description of this 
phenomenon is found in Nietzsche, despite his 
derision of "an aristocracy of the spirit.” His 
horror that the good should be hated surfaces 
repeatedly in his writings. A typical statement 
is this:
Your silent pride always runs counter to 
their bad taste; they are jubilant if for 
once you are modest enough to be vain .... 
Before you they feel small, and their 
baseness glimmers and glows in invisible 
revenge .... Indeed, my friend, you are the 
bad conscience of your neighbors: • for they 
are \mworthy of you. They hate you, there­
fore , and would like to suck your blood .... 
Flee, my friend, into your solitude and 
where the air is raw and strong! It is not 
your lot to shoo flies.1
These are strong statements; some will 
call them overstatements. Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
puts his finger on an actual fact: there exists
a class of people who, when they encounter a 
noble individual, experience him as a reproach.
And some of these people will call him evil. 
Nietzsche warns against them:
"You still feel noble, and the others 
too feel your nobility, though they bear
Natural Shame,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research (September ”1^9) : ~T“2‘'4-<,
 ̂Zarathustra 1.12.
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you a grudge and send you evil glances.
Know that the noble man stands in every­
body’s way. The noble man stands in the way 
of the good too: and even if they call 
him one of the good, they thus want to do 
away with him. The noble man wants to 
create something new and a new virtue. The 
good want the old, and that the old be pre­
served.
"But by my love and hope I beseech 
you: do no throw away the hero in your
soul! Hold holy your highest hope!"
Thus spoke Zarathustra.^
Nietzsche thus makes clear how 4.3's 
call for a moral elite stands as another reason 
for its negligible influence in later ethics. 
Despite his major divergences from Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia, he superbly cap­
tures , in certain passages, the spirit and the 
meaning of Aristotle's "megalopsychia."
Today's conception of "magnanimity" 
has a far narrower meaning. Webster's Third 
International Dictionary indicates two de­
notations: 1) "a loftiness of spirit enabling
one to sustain danger and trouble with tran­
quility, firmness, and courage," 2) "a nobility
AZarathustra 1.8. The applicability of 
all this to the character of Socrates leaps to mind.
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of feeling that is superior to meanness, 
pettiness, or Jealousy and that disdains 
revenge or retaliation: generosity of mind."
Thus we see the influence of 4.5» tut without 
the essence. The action orientation is gone, 
the concern with nobility of soul, and most of 
the excellences that these imply. It would seem 
that Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia, 
for all practical purposes* is lost. It seems 
that the misunderstandings, the fact that it 
never had a true champion, and the fact that it 
calls for a moral elite, have cast it into oblivion.
Recently, however, certain commentators 
and translators, realizing that "magnanimity" no 
longer carries the meaning of Aristotle's 
"megalopsychia," have started to use other 
expressions. Ross in his Aristotle refers to
/imegalopsychia as "proper pride or self-respect," 
and his translation of 4.5 renders it by "pride." 
Rackham, in a note to his translation of 4.5, 
observes that "megalopsychia" today means 
"lofty pride and self-esteem rather than mag-
1P. 208.
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nanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern
/Isense of the word).” Ostwald, in a note to 
his translation of 4-.3* prefers "high-mindedness” 
because ”the connotations of megalopsychia 
are much wider than the modern meaning of 
'magnanimity', [and thus]'high-mindedness' seems 
better suited to rendering the pride and con-
pfident self-respect inherent in the concept.”
Edel in his Aristotle directly trans­
lates megalopsychia as " p r i d e . S e d d o n  in his 
article refers to "Aristotle's image of the
4-great-souled man, the man of proper pride."
Grant in his. commentary on 4-.3 states ithat 
"loftiness of spirit is the highest form of 
self-respect.”^
Thus, Aristotleps conception of megalo­
psychia has been given a new lease on life. 
Despite all the misunderstanding and bad press 
and distortion, the self-respect inherent in
Loeb Classical Library, p. 213, note b.
pLibrary of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), p. 92i n » 48.
P̂. 137* ^"A Suggestion," p. 34.
^The Ethics of Aristotle, 2:72.
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Aristotle's "megalopsychia" is coming to be 
recognized, quite correctly, as central and is 
being designanted as such.
What is significant is that the megalo- 
psychos is being viewed as possessing a positive 
qualify: self-respect. This does not mean that
the above-cited commentators have given 4.3 an 
unqualified endorsement. Boss, for instance, 
speaks of the "self-respect" of the megalopsychos 
in one paragraph and in the next decries his 
lack of "self-abasement before the ideal of 
duty." Undoubtedly, Eoss would feel more at 
home with Aquinas's attempted reconciliation of 
megalopsychia and humility.
Eoss's ambivalence is symptomatic of 
the mixed attitude toward pride that prevails 
today. Although pride is generally no longer 
regarded as an unmitigated evil, it. is usually 
felt necessary to qualify pride, when recognized 
as a positive, as proper pride.
Therefore, if Aristotle's conception 
of megalopsychia is to have a future via the 
concept of pride, two conditions must be ful-
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filled. First, a certain consensus must "be 
reached over the meaning of pride. There is 
no such consensus today. Second, Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia must be recognized 
as capturing that meaning. This means that a 
certain consensus must also be reached over 
the meaning of 4.3. There is no such consensus 
today.
Nevertheless, there exists a feeling 
that pride is somehow a positive, human quality. 
"Pride is immanent in the prance of health and 
of intelligence." And what does a sense of moral 
health lead to, we can imagine Aristotle asking, 
if not to a self-respectful pride? Drawing a 
positive perspective on pride, therefore, brings 
out what seems to be its essential ingredient: 
self-respect. Herein lies the essence of 
Aristotle's megalopsychos. This is what the 
above mentioned commentators seem to be glimpsing 
in rendering megalopsychia by "proper pride," or 
"self-respect.”
In doing so, however, they have raised a 




If we conceive that pride can be, not 
arrogance as compensation for uncertainty 
[about one's sclf-valuej, but a quality of 
honor and self-respect, we come closer to 
a central, inescapable question: How can
an individual reach his full stature 
without committing the sin of pride, at­
tempting to reach beyond man’s limitations? 
Or, conversely, how is it possible for an 
individual to acknowledge the universe as 
greater than himself and to humble himself 
before it without denying self-respect and^ 
abasing himself as mean and insignificant?
Answers to such questions require clear 
definitions of pride and humility. If pride in­
volves self-respect, and humility involves 
self-abasement, then these two concepts are 
antithetic. -The operative word is "if." At 
issue is the definer's view of the universe and 
his view of human nature— complex issues each - 
of them.
From the field of psychoanalysis we can 
find a further issue well stated:
Freud assumes that both normal self­
esteem and self-aggrandizement are nar­
cissistic phenomena, the difference being 
merely one of quantity. In my opinion this 
failure to distinguish clearly between 
the two attitudes toward the self befogs 
the issue. The difference between self-­
1Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the
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esteem and self-inflation is not quanti­
tative but qualitative. True self-esteem 
rests on qualities which a person actually 
possesses, while self-inflation implies 
presenting to the self and to others 
qualities or achievements for which there 
is no adequate foundation. If the other 
conditions are present, narcissistic trends 
may arise if self-esteem and other qualities 
pertaining to the individual's spontaneous 
self are smothered. Hence self-esteem^and 
self-inflation are mutually exclusive.
The issue here is epistemological. How 
does one know, as a practicing or aspiring 
megalopsychos, that one is acting out of self- 
respect, and not self-inflation? Is the 
^just-quoted author right in her diagnosis? Is 
the difference between self-respect and self­
inflation one of quality, not quantity? Are 
self-respect and self-inflation really 
essentially different, as she claims they are? 
These are some of the issues that are raised 
by the commentators who equate Aristotle's con­
ception of megalopsychia with pride and self-
Search for Identity (New York: Harcourt, Bracesrco.7 p. 254-•




Ironically, philosophers themselves 
have to some extent befogged these issues in 
advance. For instance, when we take the three 
concepts of self-abasement, self-respect, and 
self-inflation, and consider them in light of the 
views of Aquinas and Nietzsche, the crucial 
distinctions that Aristotle so clearly makes in 
4-.3 become obscured. For Aquinas, as we have 
seen, the distinction between self-respect 
(megalopsychia) and self-abasement is blurred.
For Nietzsche, the distinction between self- 
respect and self-inflation is blurred. Whether 
or not Aquinas and Nietzsche are themselves 
directly responsible for today's confusion over 
these concepts, they are typical of the types 
of philosophic influences that are at work.
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia, 
properly understood, along the lines of this in­
quiry, has a very real role in clearing up 
today's confusion. It has been given a mandate 
for this by those commentators who render it by 
the concepts of pride and self-respect. And
1 1 0
it has received an inadvertent invitation for this 
by the psychologist who so recently laments:
"We are as much in the dark as ever about the 
origins of pride*" This darkness might one 
day be dispelled by Aristotle"s conception of 
megalopsychia.
1James C. Diggory, Self-Evaluation; 
Concepts and Studies (New York: John Wiley
& Sons,1^69), p. 114.
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CHAPTER IV
MEGALOPSYCHIA AS SELF-RESPECT 
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
In the foregoing chapters, I have 
advanced an interpretation of Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia radically different 
from prevailing views.
The most persistent of these prevailing 
views, I have indicated, regards Aristotle's 
portrait of the megalopsychos in 4.3 as sketching 
a man primarily concerned to receive externally 
bestowed honor. This, I have repeatedly insisted, 
is a notion not only mistaken by itself, but 
casts into a wrong light anything else that 
one might say about the content of EN 4.3 and 
its implications for Aristotle's ethical thinking.
In the first chapter of this study I 
presented my interpretation of 4.3» and in the 
second I outlined some of its implications for 
Aristotle's general ethical thinking. Then 
in the chapter just completed I drew a historical
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perspective on megalopsychia and attempted to 
account for its negligible influence in later 
ethical thought.
My interpretation urges that, contrary 
to surface appearances, the concern of Aristotle's 
megalopsychos is basically to enhance the nobility 
of his soul through a life of moral action. That 
is, the megalopsychos's concern is not with 
external honor, honor externally bestowed by 
his fellow man, but rather with his inner sense 
of honor. Aristotle's distinct achievement,
I have stressed, is that he has championed the 
importance of proper pride or self-respect in 
human existence and intimately linked it to 
one's moral stature.
A few pages above, I indicated the wide­
spread tendency of recent commentators to take 
at least some cognizance of the element of self- 
respect inherent in Aristotle's conception of 
megalopsychia. In this final chapter I want 
to develop further implications of this for our 
understanding of Aristotle's general ethics and,
1Pp. 103-106.
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to a lesser extent, for our understanding of
certain contemporary political thinkers.
*********************
I have already touched upon the fact 
that in Aristotle's day an accepted conception 
of megalopsychia did not exist. As Gauthier 
points out in Magnanimite^, technical terms of 
philosophy are usually vague and subject to 
fluctuation prior to the philosopher's defini-
ption. This was very much the case with meg- 
alopsychia in the 4th century B.C. Gauthier 
spells out four distinct significations that 
existed then: 1) bearing an offense with com­
posure, 2) great generosity or magnificence,
5) refusal to tolerate insult, and 4) impas­
sibility before the vicissitudes of fortune.
The first of these, megalopsychia as the ability 
to bear an offense with composure, we find in 
Democritus, in the last years of the 5th century 
and the first years of the 4th. "Megalopsychia,"
^Above, pp. 43-44, 75-
pIn the next few paragraphs I shall be 
drawing on Gauthier's lucid account of megalo­
psychia in Greek culture before and during 
Aristotle's time.
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Democritus states, "consists in enduring tact- 
lessness with composure."
The second signification, that megalo­
psychia is great generosity, or magnificence, 
we find in Demosthenes. According to Gauthier, 
Demosthenes thought that megalopsychia was "man­
ifested in the splendor of a sumptuous reception
por welcome." In Aristotle's time, Gauthier 
continues, megalopsychia and megalopreueia were 
used interchangeably. For evidence he calls 
our attention to Rhetoric 1.9 where the def­
initions Aristotle gives of these two virtues 
are "distinguishable only by barely perceptible 
nuances."^
The third signification, megalopsychia as
1DK, fr. 46.
P /Hagnanimite, p. 19, nn. 1, 2, 3-
%agnanimite^, p. 20. This is not quite 
so. The nuances are more than "barely per­
ceptible." See 1366b 15-19. Nevertheless the 
meanings do overlap: "Megalopsychia is the vir­
tue," Aristotle says, "that disposes us to do 
good to others on a large scale." Magnificence 
is a virtue "productive of greatness in matters 
involving the spending of money." Gauthier also 
cites the passage on megalopsychia in the Budemian 
Ethics, 1232a 30-31» where Aristotle mentions the 
resemblance of the megalopsychos and the mag­
nificent man.
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the refusal to tolerate insult , and the fourth,
megalopsychia as impassibility before the
vicissitudes of fortune, we find cited by
Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics;
If we were inquiring what the essential nature 
of megalopsychia is, we should examine in­
stances of men who are megalopsychos we know 
of to see what, as such, they have in common; 
such as if Alcibiades was megalopsychos, 
or Achilles and Ajax were megalopsychos, 
we should find on inquiring what they all 
had in common, that it was intolerance of 
insult; it was this which drove Alcibiades 
to war, Achilles to wrath, and Ajax to 
suicide. We should next examine other 
cases, Lysander, for example, or Socrates, 
and then if these have in common indifference 
alike to good and ill fortune, I take these 
two results and inquire what common element 
have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of 
life and - impatience of dishonor. If they 
have none, there will be two genera of 
megalopsychia.
Aristotle does not formulate here a definition to
cover both of these significations. He is simply
drawing on the word "megalopsychia1' to illustrate -
a problem in definition. What is interesting is
that in mentioning characters from Homer,
Aristotle invites us, says Gauthier, to look to




We find that, although Homer never used
the word ’'megalopsychia," he did use two words
nearly equivalent to it: ftC tictOvjk oS and 
/
jl£%c(Al\Tcj(>. Homer uses the first of these, 
"m e g a t h y m o s for one example, to denote in the 
Iliad Achilles's courage and valor in hattle.
This, Gauthier suggests, finds expression in 
Aristotle's reference to megalopsychia as in- 
volvmg refusal to tolerate an insult.
Homer uses "megaletor" in the Odyssey 
to denote Ulysses’s ability to endure misfortune. 
This, Gauthier points out, finds expression in 
Aristotle’s reference to megalopsychia as in­
volving impassibility before the vicissitudes of 
2fortune.
These four significations of megalo­
psychia, then, clearly were current in Aristotle's 
time. Each of them, as we have seen in the 
foregoing chapters, finds a place somewhere in 
Aristotle's portrait of the megalopsychos in 
4-.3« Besides these significations, however, 
many other elements of 4.3 can be discovered in
1 ^ PMagnanimite, p. 22. Ibid., p. 39.
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Greek texts written between the time of Homer
and Aristotle. These elements are presented
by various writers as qualities, not specifically
of a megalopsychos, but of the good man in general.
For example, we see such elements set forth by
Thucydides in his description of the quality of
wise moderation:
... thanks to its possession, we alone do 
not become insolent in success and give 
way less than others in misfortune; we 
are not carried away by the pleasure of 
hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which 
our .judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, 
are we any the more convinced by attempts 
to exasperate us by accusation. Ve are both 
warlike and wise and it,,is our sense of 
order that makes us so.
Such a passage clearly reminds us of 
Aristotle's account of the megalopsychos. 
is a man who "does not run into trifling 
dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he 
honors few things.” He "will be neither over­
joyed by good fortune nor overpained by
'iSpeech of Archidamus in The History 
of the Peloponnesian War, 1. 3* 84.'" Trans. 
Richard Crawley, rev. R." Feetham in Great Books 
of the Western World, Robert Haynard Hutchins, 




■1evil. Nor will he be like those who are dis­
dainful and insolent because they have such goods 
as power and wealth without having excellence of 
character.^
Later in Thucydides's History we find more 
excellences admired that will find expression 
in Aristotle's account of megalopsychia. In 
Pericles's funeral oration, he speaks of the 
qualities of the Athenian man as follows: "In
generosity we are equally singular, acquiring 
our friends by conferring, not by receiving, 
favors .... And it is only the Athenians, who, 
fearless of consequences, confer their benefits 
not from calculations of expediency, but in the 
confidence of liberality."^ Reading this, we 
recall that one of the marks of Aristotle's 
megalopsychos is "to ask for nothing or scarcely 
anything, but to give help readily."^
In the same speech by ^e'ricles we are 
again reminded of Aristotle's megalopsychos when
14.3 1124a 15. 24.3 1124a 28.
52. 6. 43. 44.3 1124b 18.
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we hear that "to a man of spirit, the degradation 
of cowardice must "be immeasurably more grievous 
than the unfelt death which strikes him in the 
midst of his strength and patriotism.” From
4.3 we already know that the megalopsychos will 
face great dangers, and when he is in danger he 
is unsparing of his life, knowing that there 
are conditions on which life is not worth
•'Ihaving." One of these conditions, Pericles
makes clear, would be to have to live with the
’'degradation of cowardice.”
Perhaps the most striking allusion to
that self-respect possessed by the man Aristotle
will later call megalopsychos is made- by the
Athenian stranger of Plato's Laws.
Wherefore I am right in bidding every one 
to honor his own soul, which everyone seems 
to honor, but no one honors as he ought; 
for honor is a divine good, and no evil thing 
is honorable; and he who thinks that he 
can honor the soul by word or gift, or any 
sort of compliance, without making her in 
any way better, seems to honor her, but 
honors her not at all .... for there is 
nothing of earthly birth which is more 
honorable than the heavenly, and he who 
thinks otherwise of tie soul has no idea 




Aside from Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia, 
the expression "to honor one's own soul," I submit, 
is the closest we will come to the concept of 
self-respect in the Greek language.
What we need to realize in view of all 
such references as the above is, first, that
pAristotle's great innovation, as I have indicated, ‘ 
was to take all these qualities admired by 
Homer, Thucydides, Plato, and Greek thinkers 
generally, and ascribe them to the megalopsychos. 
Second, we need to realize, as I have also indic­
ated, that the profound self-respect with which 
Apistotle endows his megalopsychos, is not gained 
by his receiving externally bestowed honor, but 
by developing across his lifetime his inner sense 
of honor through virtuous activity. The latter 
cannot be overstressed. The expression "to 
honor one's own soul," although the closest we 
will come to the concept of self-respect in the 
Greek language, has a meaning for Plato markedly
^727» Trans. Benjamin Jowett.
pAbove, p. 77.
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different from Aristotle's meaning. A little 
later in his Laws Plato, again through the voice 
of the Athenian stranger, continues:
Of all evils the greatest is one which 
in the souls of most men is innate, and 
which a man is always excusing in himself 
and never correcting; I mean, what is ex­
pressed in the saying that "Every man by 
nature is and ought to be his own friend." 
Whereas the excessive love of self is in
reality the source to each man of all of­
fenses; for the lover is blinded about the
beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the
just, the good, and the honorable, and 
thinks that he ought always to prefer him­
self to the truth.^
We see in this passage conflicts to 
which Aristotle's megalopsychos does not fall 
victim. Although he is a man who is indeed "his 
own best friend," who takes "delight in his
pachievements," and who knows "no regrets," 
he is a man passionately dedicated to the truth, 
not least of all the truth about himself. That 
Aristotle grants to such a man the title 
"megalopsychos," and does so because of his 
earned, inner honor and not externally bestowed 
honor is an act of great innovation and daring. 
Even during Aristotle’s own lifetime, Isocrates
1731-732. 2Above, p. 36.
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describes megalopsychis in quite different terms.
He writes: "Men of ambition and megalopsychia
not only are desirous of praise for such things
[as their great deedsj, but prefer a glorious
death to life, zealously seeking glory rather
than existence, and doing all that lies in their
power to leave behind a memory of themselves that
shall never die." By sharp contrast, for the
megalopsychos of Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics "not even honor does he hold as being
pthe greatest thing."
In light of the above survey of 
Aristotle’s predecessors and contemporaries 
it is easy to see why Aristotle's conception 
of megalopsychia might be regarded as no more 
than a reassertion of, as Boss puts it, "the 
qualities admired or disliked by cultivated 
Greeks of Aristotle's time."^ Under the pre­
vailing interpretation of 4.5, the megalo­
psychos 's primary concern is to obtain external 
aEvagoras 9*3* Trans. LaRue Van Hook 
in the Lo'eb Classical Library.
^Above, p. 28. ^Above, pp. 71-72.
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honor. As Isocrates puts it, the megalopsychos 
zealously seeks "glory rather than existence" 
and does all that lies in his power to leave 
behind a memory of himself "that shall never 
die." Clearly this is the megalopsychos of the 
prevailing interpretation of 4.3.
Besides being mistaken in itself, this 
interpretation fails to recognize the development 
of Aristotle's thinking on megalopsychia 
during the time that elapsed between the writing, 
of the two versions of his ethics. This de­
velopment, I have pointed out, is most strikingly 
manifested in the megalopsychos's attitude toward 
honor. The Budemian megalopsychos, who finds 
his "greatest joy" in receiving honor, is the 
megalopsychos of Isocrates. However, the Nico­
machean. megalopsychos is only "moderately pleased" 
at the honor he receives and holds that not 
even this honor is the "greatest thing." The 
contrast is exceedingly sharp.
The thesis that Aristotle's mature con­
ception of megalopsychia involves a man whose
^Above, pp. 50-52.
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basic concern is self-respect. and not the fame 
or glory received from without, has a number of 
further implications as well as the one just 
treated. As I have indicated in the previous 
chapter, it firmly establishes that Aristotle 
was indeed serious in his portrait of the megalo­
psychos. Now this is contrary to the thinking 
of many scholars who think Aristotle is satirizing, 
or in some other way being humorous about the 
cultured, upper-class gentlemen of his day. The 
man in 4.3, described in such detail by Aristotle, 
could indeed come across as pompous and ridic­
ulous were his basic concern really fame and 
glory. But once it is established that his 
true concern is an earned self-respect, the por­
trait must be seen in an entirely different 
light.^
A further implication is that it cuts 
the ground out from under a thinker such as 
Gauthier. Those of his persuasion all too 
easily go from the premise that the megalo- 
psychos's basic concern is great honor to the
^Above, pp. 71-74.
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conclusion that he must therefore primarily 
engage in that most honorable of human activ­
ities: theoria. Gauthier, we have seen,
elaborates a meticulously detailed general 
interpretation of Aristotle's ethics and intel­
lectual development based on this starting 
point. His case was not entirely without
Aplausibility. Yet, once establish that the 
Nicomachean megalopsychos is not really con­
cerned about external honor, and any temptation 
to follow Gauthier in his attempt to fit the 
texts to his starting assumption is gone. The 
motivation no longer exists.
This brings us to what I have stated is 
a major implication of the thesis that Aristotle's 
megalopsychos is primarily concerned with 
self-respect and not external honor. It is 
precisely this: it enables us to draw an en­
tirely different perspective on Aristotle's 
notorious bifurcation of human activity into the 
moral and the theoretical. As is well known., 
the problems inherent in this bifurcation have
^Above, pp. 4-1-4-4-.
1 2 6
plagued scholars for centuries, not least of 
which is the question of how much overlap would 
Aristotle permit "between the two types of
'Iactivity when we look at an individual person.
A typical statement is the following recent one:
A man must put his emotional and impulsive 
life in order, so that in the ensuing calm 
he may pursue his theorizing more readily; 
but once this is accomplished there seems 
to be no reason why he should prefer any 
given moral claim— say that of defending 
his friends' interests, expected even by 
traditional standards of arete— to his 
desire to philosophize.2
Now my position is that when we con­
sider -the terms in which Aristotle couches his 
3bifurcation, < there can be no way of closing it 
to the satisfaction of even a majority of 
scholars. One cannot, I would submit, expect 
to bridge the gap produced by an invalid 
dichotomy. But the major implication of this 
study's thesis for our understanding of Aristotle's 
ethics as a whole, the different perspective 
it provides us, is that the impossibility of
1
For my position on this question see 
above, pp. 58-66, with my summary on pp. 65-66.
2Arthur W. K„ Adkins, Merit and 
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960),
p. 546.
3See, for example, p. 591 above. Aristotle,
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satisfactorily bridging the gap really d.oes not
matter. Consider the situation faced, by scholars
who accept the prevailing interpretation of
4-.3- In the Hjcomachean Ethics we have two
types of life described: the theoretical life*
"useless” because it does not advance "human
goods," and the moral life, crowned by a virtue
that involves, basically, concern with fame or
glory. The ill repute which the latter has
enjoyed has been thoroughly documented in the 
2foregoing.
If, however, the basic concern of the 
megalopsychos is to enhance the nobility of his 
soul through a life of moral action, and not 
simply to glorify himself in the eyes of others, 
then, I would insist, the moral side of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics should assume a 
far greater importance than it has hitherto en­
joyed. In fact, I would urge that it is the 
moral life described by Aristotle, as idealized
in the passage I there cite, clearly concedes 
Adkins's point.
^Above, p. 59. ^Pp. 5-8, 69®
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and concretized in the person of the megalo­
psychos , that deserves the greatest amount of 
attention. The greatest achievement of 
Aristotle's ethics is that he championed self- 
respect and made real the meaning of moral en­
thusiasm. It is herein, as I shall later point 
out, that lies the greatest relevance of Aristotle's 
ethics to modern thought. But first there are 
further implications of this result for our 
understanding of Aristotle's ethical thinking.
At a number of points in the above chap­
ters I have argued for the independent status of 
megalopsychia as a virtue against those comment- 
ators who would deny to it that status. More 
might be said on this question, however, this 
time from the standpoint of megalopsychia's 
relationship to Aristotle's general theory of 
virtue. How well does megalopsychia fit into 
this theory?
Aristotle defines virtue as ''a state of 
character concerned with choice, lying in a mean,
1Pp. 11-13, 36-39, 79-81.
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that is, the mean relative to us, this being 
determined by a rational principle, and by that 
principle by which the man of practical wisdom 
would determine it.” Stating this more con­
cisely, moral virtue is a state of character dis­
posing us to choose, with the aid of nhronesis, 
the mean relative to us in action or in emotion.
We can readily see that megalopsychia,
3ust as any of the other moral virtues, is sub­
sumed by this definition. While the self-inflated 
man pursues great courses of action to which he 
does not measure up, or simply pretends to be 
worthy of such action, and the micropsychos 
fails to pursue those great courses to which 
he could measure up, the megalopsychos, by con­
trast, chooses the mean between the self-inflated 
and the microosychos, namely, those great actions 
that correspond to his worth.
However, aside from this, there are pro­
nounced differences between megalopsychia and the 
other moral virtues. One of the obvious points 
of difference is that megalopsychia is the only
1EN 2.6 1107a 1-3.
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virtue tliat involves a self-estimate. As we 
know, the megalopsychos “thinks himself worthy 
of great things, being worthy of them." We 
also know that megalopsychia involves practicing 
and continuing to practice all the moral virtues; 
that it involves the megalopsychos in a .self- 
estimate is underscored by the fact that the 
"thinks himself worthy" statement requires that 
he apply three other virtues to himself. For 
instance, the megalopsychos applies the virtue of 
particular justice to himself, claiming what is 
"in accordance with his merits." And since, as 
Aristotle says, there is no honor from others
p"that is worthy of perfect virtue," it becomes 
all the more necessary, if justice is to be done, 
for the megalopsychos to make real to himself, 
through his own power of self-reflection, the 
sense of honor which should be his for his practice 
of all the other excellences.
Thus, the megalopsychos is also in­
volved in applying the virtue of friendliness to
^Above, pp. 22-23. 24.5 1124a 8.
*\y\
himself. Friendliness means rendering to each 
person or class of people what is befitting, 
and, as we have seen, the megalopsychos is a 
a good man, and, again through his power of 
self-reflection, will be "his own best friend."
Finally, all this clearly involves the 
megalopsychos in applying the virtue of truthful­
ness to himself. In applying the virtues of justice 
and friendliness to himself and arriving at 
the awareness that he deserves great things, he 
is merely "owning to what he has, and neither more 
nor less." This is how Aristotle has character-
pized truthfulness.” Therefore the fact that 
megalopsychia involves a self-estimate, and does 
so on three counts, makes clear one way in which 
it differs from the other moral virtues.-
Another point of difference between 
megalopsychia and the other moral virtues is 
the fact that Aristotle describes the virtue of 
megalonsychia exclusively in terms of the prac­
titioner of the virtue, the megalopsychos. In­
deed, one of Aristotle's opening remarks in 4.3
Âbove, pp. 20, 36. Âbove, p. 22.
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is that ”it makes no difference whether we con­
sider the state of character or the man 
characterized by it.” The point here is not 
that Aristotle did not describe, say, the 
courageous man rather than courage itself. In 
fact he did. The point is rather that for no 
virtue is this approach so sustained as it is in 
4-.3— so much so that Aristotle feels constrained 
to remark on it. We might ask, then, why Aristotle 
adopts this approach.
We can observe first of all that the 
approach is quite natural. If we look to EN 3*6, 
we find that'Aristotle easily passes back and 
forth between descriptions of the virtue courage 
and descriptions of the courageous man. In 
fact, so easily does he do this that it does 
not even attract our attention. The reason why 
it is so natural to do this is obviously be­
cause moral virtue so intimately involves action. 
Moral virtue, we know, is a state of character, 
but one that disposes us to choose the mean in 
action or in emotion.
Aside from this, however, it is not
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inappropriate to see Aristotle's emphasis in 4.3 
on a man in action as a conscious rhetorical 
device on his part. From a literary standpoint, 
a word portrait has greater and more colorful 
impact by depicting the man in action. To ab- 
stract the virtue away from the man practicing 
it, is dry by contrast.
However, perhaps Aristotle's literary 
style in 4.3 signals a more interesting fact.
Could it be that the style he adopts is a result 
of the fact that he had a definite person in 
mind as a model megalopsychos? Adkins believes 
this to be the case. "That such men exist," he 
says of Aristotle's megalopsychos, "is evident 
from the manner in which they are spoken of." 
Another commentator draws a different conclusion. 
"Probably Aristotle traced different manif­
estations of the great-souled element in dif-
pferent people," he says, "and ... combined them." 
Others prefer to think that Aristotle had a 
single concrete in mind, such as Alexander the
Merit and Responsibility, p. 353- 
^Grant, Ethics of Âristotle. 1:72.
1 3 4
Great^ or Achilles.^
Others, still, do not believe that 
Aristotle intends to portray a real man in 4.3. 
For one example:
It is impossible to determine how far 
Aristotle was guided in his delineation of 
the megalopsychos by reference to particular 
individuals known to him. There certainly 
seem to be touches in the work suggested 
by such a reference; but it may be said, I 
think, that the work loses, rather than gains, 
by these attempts at realism, and that the 
impression which they convey, that we have 
before us a real and possible man, who, as 
described, would be intolerable, is un­
fortunate, and has contributed to the mis­understanding of the significance of megalo­
psychia in Aristotle's Ethical System.
The measured movements, and the deep voice, 
make us think of a real man: but, after
all, they are only i;he buskins and mask of 
an ideal character.-•>
I think, however, that on this point the 
following is closer to the truth:
I do not believe that Aristotle could 
have written what may be termed an "im­
possible dream" type ethical system— in’ 
this respect he remains eminently practical 
and deserves the appellation "empiricist," 
although, even in this limited context, the 
word must be quarantined by a quoting device. 
One has only to peruse his examination of the
According to Stewart, Notes 1:336, this 
was Hegel's view.
^Jaeger, Paideia, 1:420, n. 24.
^Stewart, Notes, 1:335-336.
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Platonic theory of the Good where he says 
" ... clearly it could not be achieved by 
man; but we are now seeking something 
attainable." (1096b 33-4-) Nor have I been 
able to locate any passage where, after de­
tailing a particular virtue, Aristotle pro­
claims it to be unattainable. This whole  ̂
motif is Christian rather than Aristotelian.
The question remains, then, did Aristotle
have a definite person in mind when he wrote
4-.3. A plausible case can be made for the
candidacy of Socrates as the following brings out:
... There are numerous features in the Nico- 
machean delineation of the megalopsychos 
which are reminiscent of the traditional 
picture of Socrates. He is indifferent to 
fortune (1124a 13-16); he is aware of his 
own deserts (Socrates— PI., Apol. 36b-e—  
claimed he deserved to be feasted at the 
public expense); he was indifferent to 
danger, and did not think his life a thing 
to be preserved at all costs (b 6-9); 
he was not deferential to benefactors (cf. 
his attitude to Archelaus, Rhet. II,
1398a 24), nor was he deferential to the 
celebrated .... He was given to out­
spokenness, though at the same time well 
known for his irony .... One may add that 
the picture in Plato's Symposium (220- 
221) of Socrates at the battle of Delium is 
consonant with 1123b 31* Socrates was, above 
all, the classic exemplar of the principles 
of self knowledge and self-sufficiency.2
Seddon, "A Suggestion," p. 35-
2P. A. Rees, "'Magnanimity' in the 
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics," Symposium 
Aristotelicum 21-29, (August 1969)• p. 242. Por other thinkers on these points, Rees cites
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There is no question of a correspondence 
between character traits exemplified by- 
Socrates and character traits exemplified by 
Aristotle's megalopsychos. Here vre can recall 
Socrates's courthouse statement: "I spend all
my time going about trying to persuade you, 
young and old, to make your first and chief con­
cern not for your bodies nor for your possessions,
abut for the highest welfare of your souls."
On the basis of such traits as the 
above, F. Seddon argues that Socrates is indeed 
an exemplar of megalopsychia. Furthermore, since 
Aristotle himself embodies these same traits, 
he sees 4.3 as a composite picture of Socrates
pand Aristotle. Seddon bolsters his case for 
Aristotle's candidacy by reference to the end 
.of the Sophistical Refutations where Aristotle,
on p. 241, n. 25, Th. Deman, Le temoignage 
d'Aristotle sur operates (Paris’: n.p., 1942),
p. 55, and he cites on p. 242, n. 26, E. Wolff, 
Plato's A-pologie (Berlin: n.p., 1929), esp.pp. 49-51.
1Above, pp. 76-77- 
2Seddon develops his case in "A Sug­
gestion," pp. 32-36.
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summoning our appreciation and warm thanks 
for his logical works, demonstrates that he 
thinks himself worthy of great things.
I would add in support of this the fact 
that 4.3 seems to have a personal ring to it, as 
of a man introspecting. The intimacy of such 
details as being "open in his hate and in his 
love," of being "unable to make his life re­
volve round another, unless it be a friend; for 
this is slavish," and so many others, strongly
suggests that Aristotle recognized himself as
2an embodiment of megalopsychia.
Thus'we have a further implication of 
the thesis that the megalopsychos's basic con­
cern is to enhance his self-respect. If the 
contrasting view were true, that Aristotle's 
megalopsychos is basically concerned with ex­
ternal honor, then we might readily conclude that 
Alexander the Great is indeed the person Aristotle
And is indeed worthy of them, Seddon 
suggests, p. 36 of his article, when we consider 
the magnitude of the achievement which.is 
Aristotle's Organon.
? .Without, of course, any of the self­inflation that runs through Nietzsche's Ecce
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had in mind when he wrote 4.3. If on the other 
hand the thesis of this study is correct, then 
it could not "be such men as Alexander that 
ememplify Aristotle’s megalopsychos. Rather is 
it plausible that Socrates or Aristotle himself 
stood as the model for the portrait sketch in 4.3.
This in turn suggests a further implic­
ation. If it is indeed men such as Socrates 
and Aristotle who embody the megalopsychos of 4.3, 
then they would have to stand as an embarass- 
ment to those commentators who see the megalo­
psychos as "intolerable," a conceited bad- 
mannered "prig,11 a ’’strange incubus," enough to 
make one "shudder."
.So far, then, I have outlined two 
points of difference between megalopsychia and 
the other moral virtues in Aristotle's Nico- 
machean Ethics. First, megalopsychia involves 
a self-estimate that none of the other virtues 
requires, and second, Aristotle presents megalo­
psychia, the virtue, exclusively in terms of the 
megalopsychos, the practitioner of the virtue.
Homo. See above, p. 99, n. 1.
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There exists, however, a far more 
important difference between megalopsychia and 
the other moral virtues. There is an extreme 
difference in scope. Megalopsychia, as we have 
seen, is manifested only through the achieving 
and the continued practice of all the other 
moral virtues. In this respect, megalopsychia 
is the same as phronesis. "With the presence 
of the one quality, -phronesis,ti Aristotle tells
Aus, "will be given all the virtues." Thus both 
megalopsychia and phronesis involve the whole 
moral life. While all the other moral virtues 
are specific., megalopsychia and phronesis might, 
for the sake of contrast, be regarded as general 
virtues.
Considering megalopsychia and phronesis 
by themselves, however, and the fact that they 
embrace, each of them, the whole moral life, we 
must note that they do so from different per­
spectives . This difference can be stated in 
a number of ways. Most obviously, they have 
different functions. Phronesis provides the
1ER 6.15 1145a 1-2.
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means to the other virtues, namely the faculty 
of wisely choosing the intermediate between ex­
tremes. Without this faculty, virtue, in 
Aristotle's view, is not possible; it is built 
into his very definition of virtue. Thus we can 
note that phronesis is more fundamental than 
megalopsychia since megalopsychia itself is not 
possible without the exercise of phronesis.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the 
function of megalopsychia is equally if not more 
important than phronesis. Megalopsychia pro­
vides the enthusiasm, by providing the reason, 
the motivation, for practicisng all the other 
excellences. Megalopsychia upholds as one’s 
highest moral value the nobility of one's own 
soul, one's self-respect. Megalopsychia and 
phronesis, therefore, while coextensive, are not 
identical.
This might be thought to raise a problem. 
If, as was just said, megalopsychia provides the 
motivation for practicing the other excellences, 
and if megalopsychia is not possible without 
these excellences, then how is it formed. 
Aristotle no doubt would point out that the
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potential megalopsychos has to start somewhere.
One is not born megalopsychos. And we know from
Aristotle's theory of moral responsibility,
the crucial element of which is his theory of
agency, that in Aristotle's view a person makes
himself megalopsychos. If one were to ask how
this takes place, then we can recall Aristotle's
observation that "not to know that it is from
the exercise of activities on particular objects
that states of character are produced is the
mark of a thoroughly senseless person." This,
of course, does not mean that states of character,
whether megalonsychia or some other, are developed
all at once. Aristotle tells us, for example,
that, concerning justice and the other virtues,
"we plainly say that people of a certain character
are so more or less, and act more or less in ac-
2cordance with these virtues.' Aristotle is 
here pointing out that a person develops in 
degrees or stages a disposition to act in a
^Above, pp. 14-16.
2EN 3.5 1114a 9-11.
5EN 10.3 1175a 18-20.
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certain way until, after a period of time, it
becomes a second-nature way of acting. There
is no reason for us to suppose that Aristotle
would not say this of megalopsychia as well. In
fact, we have evidence that he does. Although
he tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics that "he
who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy
2of little is temperate but not megalopsychos,"
he also tells us in the Eudemian Ethics that
the temperate man might become megalopsychos.
In children Aristotle believes that we
see the beginning of the virtuous life in their
sense of shame. He defines shame as "a kind of
fear of dishonor," consequent on bad actions,
Llspecifically voluntary bad actions. ' It is more 
like a feeling than a state of character because 
in a sense, as in fear of death, it is a bodily 
condition. As evidence, Aristotle points out
This, of course, is not meant as an 
exhaustive account of Aristotle's position on the 
development of virtue. It omits, for instance, 
the role of education and the role of pleasure. 
However, it does highlight what I take to be 
certain key elements.
21123b 6 . 51233a 23.
4-.9 1128b 12, 22, 28.
that just as people who fear death turn pale, 
so do those who feel disgraced hlush. However, 
the key point is that the sense of shame is not 
becoming to every age, but only to youth. 
Aristotle explains that young people, because 
they live by feeling and therefore commit many 
errors, need a sense of shame to restrain them, 
while an older person would not be praised for 
being prone to the sense of disgrace. This is 
because, as Aristotle puts it, "we think he 
should not do anything that need cause this 
sense.
What- we need to note here is that the 
young person’s sense of shame is the beginning of 
a sense of self-respect. As Aristotle observes, 
a child cannot be megalopsychos.^ Yet by his 
sense of shame, his fear of dishonoring himself, 
he possesses a precondition for the development 
of megalopsychia as an adult. It is only a pre­
condition because a sense of shame, in Aristotle's 
view, does not constitute a virtue. As he em-
^1128b 13-14. ^1128b 19-20.
^See, for one example, EN 1.9 1100a 1-3»
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phasizes in 4.1 * it is more characteristic of 
virtue "to do what is noble than not to do what
/Iis base." As I have already pointed out, for 
no man is this more the case than for the 
megalopsychos
We might now ask a further question, 
namely: Why should a person aspire to megalo~
psychia as an adult? Presumably Aristotle would 
answer that we have three basic choices. One 
can live a shameless existence, marked by all 
kinds of base acts, thereby dishonoring his 
soul. Clearly this path is not desirable. One 
can also, Aristotle has indicated, live a temperate 
existence. Such a person lives a life guided 
by the desire to avoid base actions. He does 
not perform noble actions but neither does he 
commit base ones. Or, Aristotle believes, one 
can live the excel],ent life, characterized by 
the performance of noble actions. This is the 
type of life that \̂ ill lead to the title "megalo­
psychos," the life that Aristotle would insist 
that all men ought to seek, though he implies
1 2Above, p. 39 • Above, p. 67•
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*1few will achieve it.
Why should one seek to attain it? 
Precisely because, Aristotle's basic answer 
would be, this is what it means to flourish 
as a human being. The shameless person, or 
even the temperate person, has settled for less 
than a fully human existence. For Aristotle, 
to live a full human existence is to flourish 
fully. By no one is this better demonstrated 
than by the megalopsychos.
An error sometimes made is to think that 
Aristotle means by "eudaimonia" some kind of
mental state'such as happiness, rather than the
. . 2ongoing activity of flourishing. “ This makes it
impossible to appreciate the role of megalo- 
psychia in Aristotle's ethics. On this view,
^See above, pp. 100-102.
2See, for one example, Ii. A. Prichard,
"The Meaning of ̂ TA^oA/in the Ethics of Aristotle," 
Philosonhy 10 (January 1935)- Reprinted in 
J. M. E» Moravcsik, ed., Aristotle: A Collection
of Critical Essays (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1967), pp. 241-260. Prichard admits 
quite openly, pp. 259-260, that he thinks 
Aristotle a psychological hedonist who holds 
that all deliberate (as distinct from impulsive) 
human acts, ultimately, are motivated by the 
desire to become happy.
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megalopsychia is simply another virtue practiced 
in order to reach the ultimate state of happiness, 
^hus it fails to realize that megalopsychia. as 
Aristotle's moral ideal, is the basic ingredient 
of the ongoing activity of moral flourishing.
As I have demonstrated, one does not achieve 
megalonsychia and then sit back and rest on one's 
laurels. Megalopsychia is intensely action 
oriented. It not only requires the achievement 
of all the other moral excellences, it demands 
their continued practice. And this continued 
practice of all the moral virtues is precisely 
what Aristotle regards as full moral flourishing 
as a human being.
The implication of the thesis that 
megalopsychia is self-respect is that, for 
Aristotle, one cannot fully flourish as a human 
being without self-respect. One's inner sense 
of honor, one's self-respect, therefore, 
represents in Aristotle’s eyes a primary human 
good. Without it one does not fully function 
as a human being.
A major source of resistance to Aristotle's
conception of megalopsychia, however one in­
terprets 4.3, is that it involves an intense 
selfishness. For the prevailing interpretation 
this is of course manifest. What could be more 
selfish than to have as a basic concern re­
ceiving honor from one's fellow man? And is 
not this one mark of an excessively proud in­
dividual?
The interpretation I have set forth, 
while markedly different from the prevailing 
view, retains the megalopsychos1s selfishness. 
To be concerned with the nobility of one’s soul 
via concern with one's moral goodness, while 
clearly more laudable than obsession with ex­
ternal honor, is no less selfish. After all, 
the megalopsychos is "his own best friend" 
and loves "himself best." He dares to take 
"delight in his achievements" and knows "no 
regrets." As we have seen, such traits have 
displeased more than one commentator. Further­
more, all are marks of the man of pride and 
pride has long been held in varying degrees of 
disrepute.
We find a forceful statement of this in
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Rousseau. He writes:
Pride must not "be confused with self- 
love: for they differ both in themselves
and in their effects. Self-love is a natural 
feeling which leads every animal to look 
to its own preservation, and which, guided 
in man by reason and modified by compassion, 
creates humanity and virtue. Pride is a 
purely relative and factitious feeling, which 
arises in the state of society, leads each 
individual to make more of himself than 
of any other, causes all the mutual damage 
men inflict one on another, and is the real 
source of the "sense of honor."'
Por Rousseau, as we can see, pride is 
synonymous with self-inflation. What is inter­
esting is that he advocates self-love, if 
properly understood. But Rousseau was followed 
by Nietzsche, in whom self-love takes on a 
radically different meaning. Nietzsche im­
plicitly equates selfish egoism with arrogant 
superiority. His "noble" egoist has an "un­
shakable faith" that "other beings must be 
subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice 
themselves." He is a person whose will to life 
sanctions the exploitation of lesser beings
pfor his own ends. In light of thinkers such
'i
A  Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. G. D. H. 'dole, n.~"2~to the "Pirst Part in Great Books of the Western World.
2Above, pp. 92-93.
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as Nietzsche, the cultural bias against self­
ishness, and the concept of a proper pride, 
becomes understandable.
However, the issue of selfishness, of 
proper pride, is more complex than this, as is 
indicated by the following:
When a man is described as selfish what 
is meant primarily is that he is moved to 
act, more often and more strongly than most 
men, by desires which are selfish. The word 
'selfish' is also applied to a disposition 
so to plan one's life as to give a larger 
place than is usual or right to the gratif­
ication of selfish desires. But what is 
it for a desire to be selfish? Professor 
Broad, in his essay 'Egoism as a theory of 
human motives' (in Ethics and the History of 
Philosophy), makes an important distinction 
’between" two main kinds of 'self-regarding' 
desires. There are first desires which are 
'self-confined', which a man could have 
even if he were alone in the world, e.g. de­
sires for certain experiences, the desire 
to preserve his own life, the desire to 
feel respect for himself. Secondly there 
are self-regarding desires which nevertheless 
presuppose that a man is not alone in the 
world, e.g. desires to own property, to 
assert or display oneself, to inspire af­
fection. Broad further points out that de­
sires which are 'other-regarding' may also 
be 'self-referential', e.g. desires for the 
welfare of one's own family, friends, school, 
college, club, nation ....
... Usually 'selfish' refers to the 
prominence of self-regarding motives, and 
different kinds of selfishness correspond to 
different self-regarding desires. The word, 
being pejorative, is more readily applied 
to the less reputable of the self-regarding
1 5 0
desires.^
This last sentence most clearly refers to 
''selfishness" when used in connection with 
Nietzsche. But "selfishness" when used in con­
nection with Aristotle's megalopsychos assumes an 
entirely different meaning. We need to observe, 
in reference to the above quotation, that, indeed, 
Aristotle's megalopsychos exhibits desires that 
are "self-confined," that he would have even were 
he alone in the world: desire to "preserve his own
life," and "the desire to feel respect for him­
self" (this most surely). But we need also to 
observe that, his desire for self-respect is, in 
Aristotle's view, largely met by fulfilling those 
other desires that presupnose a great concern for 
his fellow man. Thus he gives help readily, 
even to the point of dying for country or friend 
should that be required of him. Hardie's point 
is clear: a man can be selfish without being a
Nietzsche. The megalopsychos of 4.3 exemplifies 
an Aristotelian selfishness or pride, and this, 
we must conclude, is profoundly different from
^W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in 
Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy 15 (1965). He-
15 1
Niet zschean selfishness. It is the "noble” 
soul exemplifying Nietzschean selfishness that 
should cause commentators to "shudder.” The 
same response should not be evoked by Aristotle's 
megalopsychos, at least not if one understands 
what he represents.
The selfishness inherent in Aristotle's 
conception of megalopsychia or self-respect, 
therefore, need give no cause for hesitation.
We can see, by contrasting Aristotle and 
Nietzsche on the issue of selfishness, that, 
as Hardie claims, there are indeed two types 
of self-regarding desires. It is to the 
Aristotelian type that certain contemporary 
thinkers are implicitly referring when they 
advance self-respect as a primary human good. And 
it is to this modern regard for self-respect 
and Aristotle's relevance to it that I wish 
to devote the remaining pages of this study.
I*********************
The most vocal contemporary advocate of
printed in Moravcsik, ed„, Aristotle: A
Collection of Critical Essays, pp. £97-522.
For this citation, pp. 311-3^2.
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self-respect as a basic human good is without
question Rawls. Writing in his well known
Theory of Justice he says:
... perhaps the most important primary good 
is that of self-respect .... We may define 
self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two 
aspects. First of all, as we noted earlier, 
it includes a person's sense:of his own 
value, his secure conviction that his con­
ception of his good, his plan of life, is 
worth carrying out. And second, self- 
respect implies a confidence in one's ability, 
so far as it is within one's power, to ful­
fill one's intentions. When we feel that 
our plans are of little value, we cannot 
pursue them with pleasure or take delight 
in their execution. Nor plagued by fail­
ure and self-doubt can we continue in our 
endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect 
is a primary good. Without it nothing may 
seem worth doing, or if some things have 
value for us, we lack the will to strive 
for them. All desire and activity becomes 
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and 
cynicism.^
There can be no doubt that Aristotle's 
megalopsychos meets the two aspects of self- 
respect Rawls sets forth. To think himself 
"worthy of great things, being worthy of them," 
this characterization alone, requires that the 
megalopsychos have a real "sense of his own 
value," and a confidence in his ability to ful-
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)» P* 44-0
(hereafter cited as Rawls, Justice).
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fill his intentions* As we have seen, he is his 
"own best friend," and "loves himself best," 
and is a man who "knows no regrets.”
As I have pointed out, self-respect, in 
Aristotle's account, is a virtue extremely broad 
in scope, so broad that I would classify it 
a general virtue. Again, on this, there is a 
correspondence between Rawls's conception of 
self-respect and Aristotle's. This is il­
lustrated by Rawls's statement that "self-respect 
is not so much a part of any rational plan of
life as the sense that one's plan is worth carry- 
•1ing out." Implicit here is Aristotle's mes­
sage in 4.3 that self-respect gives to a person 
that sense of worthiness that will lead him to 
pursue other desired human qualities within 
his "plan of life."
But the points of correspondence between 
Aristotle and Rawls on the subject of self- 
respect go no further than these. When vie view 
Rawls's conception in the philosophic framework 
within which he writes, we can see profound
^Justice, p. 178*
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differences "between it and Aristotle's con­
ception of megalopsychia.
As I have pointed out, Aristotle's 
megalopsychos exhibits an intense, though 
benevolent selfishness or pride. This, I have 
shown, rests upon his recognition of his moral 
worth. "He thinks himself worthy of great 
things, being worthy of them," a clear-cut in­
dication that the megalopsychos recognizes his 
moral stature. Now Eawls's self-respecting 
man would have to be quite a different sort of 
person. "The idea of rewarding desert is im­
practical," declares Rawls. "And certainly to 
the extent that the precept of need is emphasized, 
moral worth is ignored .... we may assume that 
everyone is of equal moral worth." For Rawls 
the notion of moral desert is irrelevant to the 
issue of self-respect. He writes:
The precept which seems intuitively to come 
closest to rewarding moral desert is that 
of distribution according to effort, or 
perhaps better, conscientious effort .... 
however, it seems clear that the effort a 
person is willing to make is influenced 
by his natural abilities and skills and
aJustice, p. 512.
1 5 5
the alternatives open to him. The better 
endowed are more likely, other things equal, 
to strive conscientiously, and there seems 
to be no way to discount for their greater 
good fortune.^
Rawls then, in extreme contrast to 
Aristotle, divorces self-respect from one's
pmoral stature. Where then, we need to ask, 
does self-respect come from in Rawls's eyes? 
Rawls's answer is that it comes from other 
people— in two ways. "A desirable feature of a 
conception of justice,” he writes, "is that it 
should publicly express men's respect for one 
another. In this way they insure a sense of 
their own v a l u e . T h u s  Rawls makes it clear 
that our self-respect depends on the good opinion 
of others. As he elsewhere puts it, "our 
self-respect normally depends upon the respect
^Justice, p. y \ 2 .
2For Aristotle's account of moral responsib- 
ity, see above, pp. 14-16.
55̂Justice, p. 179- We see here how Rawls connects the concept of self-respect and the sub­ject of his book, justice. What he says about self-respect, however, stands or falls quite independently of his conception of justice.
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1of others." And "unless our endeavors are
appreciated by our associates it is impossible
for us to maintain the conviction that they are 
oworthwhile." Thus we see one way in which we 
gain self-respect from others is simply by 
being esteemed by them.
A second way, Rawls thinks, is by 
receiving from them those objective goods, such 
as opportunity, income, and the good things in
xlife generally, that will give us social stature. 
As Rawls expresses this point, "a person's lesser 
position as measured by the index of objective 
primary goods may be so great as to wound his 
self-respect."
Thus the split between self-respect and 
one's moral stature is an extreme one for Rawls, 
and it is precisely on this point, and its ram- • 
ifications, that Aristotle's conception of 
megalopsychia is relevant. Aristotle would want
^Justice. p. 178. %bid., p. 441.
^See pp. 510 and 3A5, among other places in Justice.
4Justice, p. 55^-
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to know, as would we, the following: Even if
a person could gain self-respect by receiving 
the esteem of others, on what grounds would 
this esteem be granted, if moral stature is ir­
relevant. Rawls, we have seen, assumes, in 
laying out the social conditions upon which self- 
respect rests, "that everyone is of equal moral 
worth." Thus self-respect is not a function of 
moral worth to Rawls. After all, one program 
of his theory of justice is to set forth the 
social conditions that provide for the fair 
distribution of the most important of primary 
goods, self-respect. And if self-respect were 
a function of moral worth, such a distribution 
would not even arise as a problem; if everyone 
were of equal moral worth, then everyone would 
have equal self-respect.
This of course is where those objective 
goods, such as opportunity, income, and the 
good things in life generally, come into play. 
These, Rawls tells us, when deficient, will 
wound one's self-respect. Thus one person (or
^Above, p. 154.
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society) can directly bolster another's self- 
respect by imparting to him a greater share in 
such goods.
Again, however, certain observations 
Aristotle makes in connection with his con­
ception of megalopsychia become relevant. As 
we have already see, Aristotle thinks it un­
characteristic of the self-respecting man to seek 
a sense of self-worth from external goods. He 
suggests that this would be an inversion. As 
he has so aptly stated it, man does not "acquire
or preserve virtue by the help of external goods,
1but external goods by the help of virtue."
But more than this is Aristotle's further 
observation— and again the sharpness of his 
perception is impressive— that the mere pos­
session of external goods, whether it be the 
esteem of others, or those other goods cited 
by Rawls, does not lead to self-respect anyway.
On the contrary, Aristotle points out in 4.3» 
unaccompanied by virtue, they only make a person
p"disdainful and insolent." And these are marks—  
1Above, p. 51. ^1124a 29.
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not of a self-respecting person— but of the 
self-inflated person.
We might ask at this point why it is that 
Eawls divorces self-respect from one's moral 
stature. Relevant to getting at an answer are 
the following remarks concerning Rawls's account 
of self-respect:
What strikes us immediately about this 
account, especially if we have comparable 
Greek views in mind, is its insistence on 
the subjectivity of these phenomena. Shame 
is a feeling or emotion, self-respect a 
sense of worth, a feeling of capacity, an 
inner conviction. According to this account, 
apparently, a position that is not felt as 
shameful is not so. And if you feel your 
life-plan to be a worthy one, and feel con­
fident that you can carry it out, that 
appears sufficient to make you a person of 
seif-respect. Rawls thus implicitly denies 
that the objective (or intersubjective) 
value of my pursuits and the truth of my 
beliefs about them are at all relevant to 
the issue of self-respect and shame. *
Here we have an explanation of Rawls's
Martha Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness, 
and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of
Plato," in A. Rorty, ed., Mind and the Good 
(University of California Press, forthcoming). 
Emphasis in the original. Nussbaum, a colleague 
of Rawls at Harvard, reminds us in a note to the 
above passage that "the bulk of Greek literature 
.... ascribes great importance to the sense of 
shame, attacks the vice of shamelessness, and 
connects the avoidance of shame with excellence 
of character and action in accordance with shared 
norms•"
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separation of self-respect from one's moral 
stature. The subjectivity of Rawls's account 
of the value of a life plan explains the ease 
with which he can assume that "everyone is of 
equal moral worth.” And for reasons already 
given this makes moral stature irrelevant to
-tself-respect.
This is where Aristotle's conception 
of self-respect becomes most relevant to a 
thinker such as Rawls. Aristotle's conception 
suggests that Rawls fails to distinguish 
between a genuine self-respect and a mere 
felt or pseudo-self-respect. As he has em­
phasized in 4-„3, men become disdainful and inso­
lent when, without virtue, they have external 
goods. Aristotle does recognize that men pur­
sue honor in order to be assured of their own 
2goodness. But the whole implication of his 
conception of megalopsychia is that it is only 
a man who is not really good who will seek a 
sense of self-worth by pursuing external honor. 
In contrast is the emphasis of Aristotle's con­
1 PAbove, p. 157. See above, p. 30.
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ception of megalopsychia in 4-.3, that the basic 
concern of the truly self-respecting man is 
not great honor or, as Hawls expresses it, 
respect from others. Not even this, we have 
seen Aristotle insist, is, for the self-respecting 
person, the greatest of goods.
Nussbaum, in contrasting Rawls's notion
of self-respect with the general conception held
by Greek thinkers, remarks that in the Greek mind
self-respect ... appears to be closely 
bound up with character, and with the ex­
cellences of both character and intellect .... 
The activities of the self-respecting man, 
to be worthy rather than merely lucky, 
must be chosen for good reasons, in awareness 
of their-value ... self-respect seems, then 
less like a feeling identified subjectively 
then like a disposition to both act and feel 
in certain appropriate ways. '
For no Greek thinker are these remarks 
more true than for Aristotle. His crucial con­
tribution to any later theorizing concerning 
self-respect is that he was the first to so 
clearly distinguish self-inflation, self-respect, 
and self-abasement, and connect self-respect 
to one’s moral stature. He was the first to
1"Shame, Separateness, and Political 
Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato."
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give us a detailed portrait of what a person 
with genuine self-respect might be like.
For such a vision and for conveying it 
to us in the vivid terms of a flourishing human 
being, I submit, we owe Aristotle the same 
tribute he sought at the end of another of his 
works, our admiration and— our warm thanks.
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